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The importance of Research and Development (“R&D”) in generating innovation is an often-
discussed matter among scholars and politicians. The conclusions from academic literature on 
the matter seem to vary between studies and when addressing different types of R&D 
incentives. In New Zealand, there has been interest in using R&D incentives to increase R&D 
expenditure, which hypothetically leads to better economic growth, knowledge-spillovers and 
the gaining of a competitive advantage with markets overseas. The reason for the increased 
interest in R&D perhaps most dominantly stems from an Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) R&D survey. The survey shows that in comparison 
with other OECD countries of comparable size New Zealand‟s R&D spending is noticeably 
substandard, hence, the urging importance of discovering an effective way to alter business 
behaviour and increase R&D spending. This necessity to increase R&D spending invites the 
need for R&D incentives as well as increase the volume of experimental research conducted 
with the resolve of better understanding the collective effects involved in utilising different 
R&D policy tools to cultivate R&D expenditure. With the intention of adding to the sparse, 
non-quantitative R&D incentive discussion, this project provides a qualitative review of prior 
and current R&D incentives used in New Zealand. This project further evaluates the possible 
effectiveness of New Zealand‟s past and current R&D incentives in terms of equity, certainty, 
convenience and economy. This project utilises the case study approach and the qualitative 
documentary analysis method to perform an exploratory study that applies Adam Smith‟s 
(1776) Principles of Good Taxation as an evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of 
the above-mentioned incentives. The tentative findings show effectiveness according to 
Adam Smith‟s framework in relative ranking being: the R&D Tax Credit and R&D Cash Out 
of losses incentives are tied in first place, followed by the new R&D Callaghan Innovation 
Grants in second place.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The advancing speed of technological transformation and receding product life cycles are 
compelling many firms to generate and commercialise knowledge using a more timely and 
cost-efficient approach. Companies are consequently continuously searching for ways to 
deepen and broaden their innovative abilities, which are essential for their long-term 
existence and evolution (Faems et al., 2005). For instance, by processes that include investing 
funds in R&D to accelerate innovation. Moreover, considering the level of worldwide 
governmental engagement in the matter, most governments believe that government policy 
favourably influences the rate of technological advancement by Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME). Hence, they have set up an array of mechanisms to nurture innovation, 
such as R&D incentives (Meuleman, & De Maeseneire, 2012). 
In 2005, Sawyer recapped the tentative steps New Zealand had taken towards improving the 
tax treatment of R&D spending. Sawyer laments that New Zealand had not embraced 
functional change to make its R&D tax regime further competitive universally. Sawyer 
makes the following observation regarding New Zealand‟s position in reference to improving 
the tax treatment of R&D spending: “New Zealand is in effect “at the cross-roads” in terms of 
choosing which path (or paths) it should follow to encourage further investment in R&D, 
such as incentive deductions, subsidies (or tax credits), or grants” (Sawyer, 2005, p.2). Over a 
decade later, New Zealand finds itself in that same position. The lack of qualitative research 
that reviews R&D incentives provides an opportunity for this research project to contribute to 
the existing body of literature.  
This project is a case study that reviews past and current New Zealand R&D incentives using 
Adam Smith‟s Principles of Good Taxation as an evaluation framework. The research 
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method for undertaking this investigation is documentary analysis of published material in 
relation to 1) R&D Tax Credit, 2) R&D Grants and 3) the R&D Cash Out of losses incentive. 
The documents used for investigation include regulatory impact statements (RIS) from the 
Inland Revenue, submissions from taxpayers to the Finance and Expenditure Committee 
(FEC) and discussion documents produced by the New Zealand Treasury in relation to R&D 
incentive repeals and enactments.  
This research aims to make qualitative comments of the political influences motivating the 
past and current R&D incentive options yet to appear in New Zealand. This thesis applies an 
institutional theoretical framework which seeks to address the extent of the role that 
institutional arrangements assume to an explanation of the context that transpires between the 
enactment, repeal and the legislative changes of R&D incentive policy in New Zealand.  
This framework assists the research findings by allowing the researcher to cast a critical eye 
to offer insights into how the R&D policy design process advantages and disadvantages 
certain groups. Other objectives for this research include an exploration of each incentive and 
a cross-comparative analysis among all R&D incentives. These inquiries would eventually 
lead to the third process pertaining to this research drawing tentative conclusions as to which 
incentive(s) in this research is/are likely to be considered the most effective when 
benchmarked against Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation.  
1.1 Importance of Topic 
A report published in 2013 by Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) disclosed that R&D is a 
significant means of enabling economic growth and for upholding a strong New Zealand 
economy. R&D is an activity that is paramount to the development of new knowledge; it 
influences society by generating new marketplaces and new wage earning prospects.  
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A study by Griffith (2000) estimated private companies‟ rate of return and revealed 
that private businesses which invest in R&D receive a 10 – 15 per cent rate of return; some 
studies show that the rate of return can be as high as 30 per cent (Griffith, 2000, p.3). These 
benefits create job opportunity, the potential to produce new activities, and could strengthen 
New Zealand‟s competitiveness overseas. Griffith (2000, p.5) explains, “R&D not only 
stimulates innovation but also plays an important role in the adoption of existing 
technologies”. Therefore, R&D leads to innovation and it helps companies to understand how 
to utilise new technologies to further their development.  
For example, Fonterra
1
 established the Fonterra Research and Development Centre (FRDC) 
which is one of the “largest research facilities in the world dedicated to dairy” (Fonterra 
Website, 2012). This commitment to R&D is one of the reasons Fonterra was able to stay on 
the cutting-edge of dairy innovation. This is one example of the deemed importance of R&D 
as it is proven vital to thriving in a fast changing market. According to Hong et al. (2013, 
p.2), New Zealand innovation is very reliant on the firms‟ ability of developing new 
knowledge and market demand. Small firms can also benefit from R&D; while R&D is 
usually internally generated, a small to medium business can still benefit from public 
resources and knowledge.  
However, the most pressing reason to purse R&D tax incentives in New Zealand is that the 
nation‟s long-run productivity performance has been substandard. New Zealand‟s R&D 
expenditure is below the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
average, as New Zealand is currently placed 29
th
 out of 35 OECD members for R&D 
Spending as a percentage of R&D (OECD, 2016). This confirms the importance of 
                                                          
1
 Fonterra is a worldwide, co-operatively-owned company founded in New Zealand. For further 




conducting research on R&D tax incentives to provide potential recommendations on an 
effective R&D tax incentive reform to level the playing field internationally.  
1.2 Contribution to Research 
This thesis sets out to make two primary contributions. Firstly, to perform an overarching 
review of the environment that shaped the policies for the past R&D Tax Credit, and the 
current R&D Callaghan Grants and R&D Cash Out of Losses incentive regimes in New 
Zealand. This review includes a brief historical overview in Chapter 3 under section 3.2. This 
research adopts an institutional framework whereby there is a wish to clarify the New 
Zealand R&D regime landscape facilitating an understanding of the rationales behind each 
policy created. 
The second key contribution of the research is to provide insights into how equitable, certain, 
convenient and economical each incentive is. These principles are used in this thesis as the 
overarching evaluative framework and are derived from the Adam Smith (1776) Principles of 
Good Taxation.  
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2, „Literature Review‟, of this project provides a general overview of R&D. The 
chapter first presents the topic of R&D in general, and then briefly introduces research that 
discusses the value of R&D incentives. Next, the chapter begins to unravel some of the issues 
that pertain to performing R&D; the reluctances that companies have towards R&D 
investment. Some of the reluctances include R&D‟s high financial risks. This brief review 
also identifies some appropriate overseas examples regarding R&D definitions applicable for 
consideration in New Zealand. 
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Chapter 3, ‘Current New Zealand R&D Regimes & Legislation‟, describes the historical 
context and exchanges that have led to the current R&D incentive and legislative 
environment. This section will describe the journeys undergone by each of the following: the 
past R&D Tax Credit, current R&D Grants and the new R&D Cash Out incentives. This 
chapter aims to inject coherence to the existing body of knowledge of the R&D incentives 
under study and identify gaps in current research, and indicate how this explorative research 
attempts to add to the New Zealand R&D incentive body of knowledge.  
Chapter 4, „Research Questions, Methods and Methodology‟, describes the qualitative 
exploratory research, which uses Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation as the 
standard for comparison across the three incentives at hand. This chapter also describes the 
research development, design and the theoretical framework comprising institutional theory, 
qualitative methodology and research tools operated to address the research questions asked. 
The literature review undertaken in the previous chapters highlights the motivations for the 
researcher to undertake her research and concludes that there is limited qualitative research 
that reviews past and current New Zealand R&D incentives.  
Chapter 5, „Discussion‟, intends to present the research findings as to which R&D 
incentive(s) among New Zealand‟s past and current R&D incentive systems is/are likely to be 
the most effective in terms of being the most equitable, convenient, certain, and economical - 
that is, the R&D incentive(s) most reflective of Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good 
Taxation.  
This chapter will involve the following main processes:    
 Exploration of each incentive‟s merits and shortfalls individually;  
 A comparative analysis of selected R&D incentives; and    
 A critical evaluation concluding which incentive(s) is/are likely most effective  
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The above processes aim to answer the following research questions within this chapter: 
 
RQ1: Why did each incentive come into being? (Policy intentions) 
RQ2: How does each incentive fare when benchmarked against Adam Smith’s 
Principles of Good Taxation?  
RQ3: Which incentive(s) is/are likely most effective according to the above 
assessments? 
Chapter 6, „Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Research‟, recaps the discussion findings 
from chapter 5 above to answer this project‟s research questions and provide, in terms of 
Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation, evaluation in relative ranking as to which 
out of the three incentives examined in this research is likely the most effective. This chapter 
recaps what this research would have achieved and describes limitations of this research that 
future research can address.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The pivotal role of innovation as a key driver of economic growth and development is a 
matter that is well articulated in the past two decades according to the recent Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publication titled „The Innovation 
Imperative‟ (OECD, 2015). Advancing innovation and developing new competitive 
advantages have proved to be important issues for countries far and wide. Especially 
considering these countries‟ desire to combat stagnant business thinking,  realise knowledge 
spillovers, and appeal to foreign multinationals. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a 
clear universal trend for strengthening innovation in the quest for greater prosperity and 
better lives (OECD, 2015, p.3).  
R&D is a component of innovation. R&D Investment in OECD countries has risen steadily 
over the last few decades (OECD, 2011a). This may indicate that undertaking R&D activities 
is an enduring reality for OECD economies that practice this process to cultivate innovation. 
OECD countries tend to compete in terms of innovation. The measurement of R&D as a 
percentage of GDP is one standard indicator of how innovative a country is, hence, 
governments encourage firms to increase their R&D spending. However, many challenges 
stand in the way of countries increasing their R&D spending. 
One line of thought contends that R&D activities are both challenging to fund and finance in 
a freely competitive market. This is as the knowledge derived by the R&D undertaken by one 
firm is essentially non-rival and can trigger a free rider effect by being utilised by other firms. 
This economic theoretical modeling has had a long backing in research (For example: Hall, 
2002; Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959; Schumpeter, 1942). R&D incentives therefore exist to 
counter prominent market failures in R&D investment. Investment in R&D is a risky activity 
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or as one OECD study further explains, “Due to recognised market failures, governments use 
a range of mechanisms to further stimulate business R&D” (2002, p.8). Hence, these 
programs are a government intervention created to motivate people to increase their R&D 
spending.  
The following subsections provide a general overview of R&D incentives including a look 
back at the creation of policy tools. The chapter first presents an overview of public policy 
tools. Next, the chapter begins to unravel some of the issues that pertain to performing R&D; 
the reluctances that companies have towards R&D investment that cause market failures. 
Some of the reluctances include R&D‟s high financial risks. This brief review also identifies 
some appropriate overseas examples regarding R&D definitions applicable for consideration 
in New Zealand. 
2.2 The Inception of Public Policy Tools 
Schneider and Ingram (1990) refer to incentive tools as political phenomena after analysing 
the incentive tools‟ underlying behavioural assumptions. The topic of this research will hone 
in on tools that reward behaviour that is conductive to policy goals that classify as incentives, 
subsidies, rebates and technical programs. The ‘Current New Zealand R&D Regimes & 
Legislation‟ chapter below discusses these in further depth. 
An instance of a scenario that brings about a need for a change in behaviour is 
underinvestment in R&D due to citizens‟ reluctance to take financial risks. Governments can 
offer taxation policies, incentives or other rebates to overcome reluctances by encouraging 
and assisting societies to assume otherwise unattractive tasks. Nowadays, the idea of 
externality remains a fundamental notion to modern welfare economics and to environmental 
economics. An OECD innovation report (2007) argues that reforms are required in order to 
ensure that public policy is increasingly conducive to innovation in many policy areas. 
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Governments may also assume a more direct approach in fostering innovation in terms of 
public investment in science and basic research that can play an important role in permitting 
additional innovation.  
The above suggestions for direct and indirect governmental support for innovation require a 
suitable combination of direct and indirect instruments. Governments have a long-standing 
history in terms of proliferation of instruments that they implement in order to influence 
behaviours within their jurisdictions. The OECD report lists these as any of “tax credits, 
direct support and well-designed public private partnerships, support for innovative clusters 
and rigorous evaluation of such public support” (2007, p.5). Innovation policy makers‟ have 
recently started to uptake a wide range of instruments known as a „policy mix‟ – a term 
derived from an economics-centric paradigm that emphasises the interactions between 
policies (For example see: Flanagan et al, 2011; Salamoun, 2002, 1989; Peters, 1997; Doern 
and Wilson, 1974; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953).  
In summary, the ability of public policy tools to unravel social and economic problems 
constitute part of why these tools exist. They arose to accommodate man‟s need for them as 
they essentially steer citizen behaviour towards a desired result unravelling issues such as 
market failure. All the meanwhile mitigating the polarization that would likely, in their 
absence, otherwise ensue. This research aims to explore the policy instruments incentivizing 
R&D in New Zealand. The next subsection will review several differing definitions of R&D 
and briefly comment on the possible effects that the definitions of R&D may bring forth. 
2.3 The R&D Definition Problem 
There are many definitions of R&D across an extensive body of literature. R&D research 
(Sawyer, 2005) concerning the requirements for good policy design commissioned by the 
Royal Society of New Zealand uncovered valuable insights. The insights on the requirements 
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for good policy design included: “simplicity, low administration costs, low compliance costs, 
reliability and long-term stability; assured refundability; good visibility and transparency; and 
use of the OECD‟s Frascati definition for R&D” (Sawyer, 2005, p.136). The last suggested 
requirement for good policy design stems from the ambiguity following use of the definitions 
given by the Financial Reporting Standards 13 (FRS 13).
2
  
The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA)
3
 separately defined 
“Research” under paragraph 4.2 in the FRS 13. „Research‟ according to FRS 13 is an 
“original and planned investigation undertaken with the prospect of gaining new scientific or 
technical knowledge and understanding” (NZICA, 1995, p.3). Meanwhile „Development‟ is 
defined under paragraph 4.1 as “the application of research findings or other knowledge to a 
plan or design for the production of new or substantially improved materials, devices, 
products, processes, systems or services prior to the commencement of commercial 
production or use” (NZICA, 1995, p.3). NZICA later on changed FRS 13 to the International 
Accounting Standard 38 (IAS 38) „Intangible Assets‟. IAS 38 has the same definition as 
previously with Research and Development defined separately (NZICA, 2004, p.15).  
In examining the feasibility of the current R&D rules, and to identify areas of concern, the 
New Zealand Government decided to take counsel from a private sector R&D Liaison Group. 
New Zealand‟s decision to make parallels between its own financial reporting standards with 
the international reporting standards seemed challenging. It brought forth concern by the 
R&D Liaison Group, who asked the Government to contemplate implications pursuant to the 
decision of tax rules joining the FRS 13. The predominant concern brought forth by the R&D 
Liaison Group at the outset is that there is a sweeping uncertainty regarding the definition of 
R&D (or lack thereof). 
                                                          
2
 Now International Accounting Standards 38 (IAS 38) - Para 57. 
3
 Known as Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ) as at 1/07/2015. 
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One definition that is widely accepted by scholars (and recommended by the R&D Liaison 
Group) for use in New Zealand defines R&D as a means of advancing knowledge. The 
Frascati Manual definition (2002, p.30) defines R&D as involving: “creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including 
knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications”. This definition alludes to R&D as one example of a driving force for 
innovation, and by way of association, a driver of competitiveness and economic 
performance. Another source of definition for what R&D activities comprise of is contained 
in the New Zealand Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007. R&D activities are known as Systematic, 
Investigative and Experimental Activities (S.I.E) under section LH 7(2) of the ITA 2007 
which describes R&D as mainly concerned with acquiring new knowledge, creating new or 
improved products or services or other such activities. 
In addition, while Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) does not directly define R&D, SNZ 
nevertheless defines innovation as “the introduction or development of any new or 
significantly improved goods, services (products), processes, or methods”. This definition 
embraces a range of activities, as one constituent of innovation. The Frascati Manual defines 
R&D as an activity, which covers original, innovative and exploratory work systematically, 
conducted to increase the stock of knowledge. Sawyer (2005) found that both Australia and 
the UK, both prominent players in the OECD, use a definition of R&D eligible for 
concession similar to that given in the OECD‟s Frascati Manual. These countries will 
nominate an activity as R&D for tax purposes if it would be regarded as R&D under normal 
accounting practice, as qualified by what the meaning of research and development for tax 
purposes is (similar to Frascati Manual definition).  
In conclusion, definitions of R&D for tax purposes tend to differ, sometimes significantly, 
from the OECD benchmark. However, one line of thought justifies the differing R&D 
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definition explaining that this is in order to meet the policy objectives of particular countries. 
Some R&D tax incentives are structured to deliver broadly based support, others target 
specific types of R&D or companies (e.g., new firms, smaller firms or non-taxpaying firms), 
and still others focus on regional objectives. Countries offer various types of accelerated 
deductions, bonus deductions or tax credits based on total or incremental spending. One 
OECD study (2002, p.8) describes: “The choice of approach - government research efforts, 
partnerships, direct support to business R&D, market-based incentives, etc. depends largely 
on the national context”. This quote portrays an opinion that justifies the use of different 
government approaches in different national contexts as necessary.  
While the support for using varied R&D definitions may be to achieve different policy 
objectives as far as the national context requires, the researcher disagrees with this 
justification, as perhaps a unified definition for R&D is more likely to reduce the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of R&D (as referred to by the R&D Liaison Group above). The 
embracing of the Frascati Manual definition in particular has scholarly and reasoned 
economic backing and is preferable for comparative purposes. A unified definition for R&D 
would also limit the opportunity for discrimination against certain companies. For those 
reasons, the researcher believes that a unified definition of R&D is likely best. 
2.4 The Black-Hole Expenditure Aspect 
Governments generally attempt to support business by incentivizing R&D investment. 
Increased R&D Investment in OECD countries is likely an expected reality as research shows 
that R&D investment has grown steadily over the last few decades (OECD, 2011a). R&D 
incentives exist in part due to obstacles that stand in the way of those who wish to undertake 
R&D. One such obstacle is the non-deductibility of “black-hole” expenditure as the potential 
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for R&D expenditure to be treated as black-hole expenditure results in economic distortions 
(Inland Revenue, 2013, Para 2.5). 
“Black-hole” expenditure (BHE) is a term given to business expenditure that is not deductible 
instantly for tax purposes. BHE is also not part of the cost of a depreciable asset for tax 
purposes which means that it cannot be deducted over time as depreciation (Inland Revenue, 
2013, Para 1.2). As Sawyer explains (2005, p.115): “Black-hole expenditure occurs when a 
business incurs R&D costs which are capitalised, but the project is subsequently abandoned 
or scaled back because it is less successful than originally anticipated”. This possibility of 
complete failure to claim back any tax on R&D expenditure creates a risk that may 
discourage businesses from undertaking R&D that they would have undertaken if deductions 
were available.  
The New Zealand Government had recognised BHE as expenditure that proves valueless to 
taxpayers in that it is neither immediately deductible nor depreciable. In 2006, Inland 
Revenue published a discussion document that aimed to address the deterring effect of BHE 
after receiving several concerns from taxpayers. The document stated that the Government 
addressed BHE problems on a “case-by-case basis” (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, Para 3.29). For 
the sake of increasing R&D investment, it was important to address taxpayers‟ BHE concerns 
in a more robust manner. In an effort to mitigate the risk of undertaking R&D, taxpayers 
demanded certainty that particular expenditure incurred for their businesses would be eligible 
for tax deductions or amortisation (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, Para 3.30).  
Better BHE management soon became a priority as a means to ensure neutrality in the tax 
system. A briefing note prepared for the Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) (Inland 
Revenue, 2005) proposed amendments targeted at BHE concerning reducing BHE-caused 
distortions discouraging R&D investment. The proposed amendments pursued the following: 
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“Allowing capitalised development expenditure to either be deducted over time as 
depreciation (where the R&D results in a depreciable intangible asset) or deducted upon 
the intangible asset being written off for accounting purposes (where the R&D does not 
result in a depreciable intangible asset)” (Inland Revenue, 2005, p.4) 
These proposed changes aimed towards encouraging taxpayers to undertake more R&D as 
the changes effectively cancel out some of the taxpayer reluctance to undertake certain types 
of expenditure and investment solely because of their tax treatment.  
BHE‟s detrimental effect on R&D spending is an important aspect to consider for companies 
performing R&D. The New Zealand Government has therefore shown signs of progress by 
making amendments to R&D legislation over the years. The most recent noteworthy 
amendments to the Taxation (Annual Rates for 2015-16, Research and Development, and 
Remedial Matters) Act include allowing further deductions on BHE. These amendments aim 
to provide further certainty for taxpayers and create neutrality in the tax system that may 
overflow into creating more R&D spending. 
2.5 Summary 
The ability of public policy tools to unravel social and economic problems is in part the 
reason behind the tools‟ existence. This research aims to explore the policy instruments 
incentivizing R&D in New Zealand. The above sections have briefly reviewed several 
differing definitions of R&D. Definitions of R&D for tax purposes tend to differ, sometimes 
significantly, from the OECD standard. A unified definition for R&D would also limit the 
opportunity for discrimination against certain companies. For those reasons, the researcher 




CHAPTER 3: CURRENT NEW ZEALAND R&D REGIMES & LEGISLATION  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the past R&D Tax Credit, current R&D Grants and the new R&D 
Cash Out option, and identify the main themes and trends indicated by prior research by 
relaying the R&D journeys undergone and identifying precursors to the incentives. This 
section aims to add coherence to the existing body of knowledge of R&D incentives, identify 
gaps in current research, and indicate what this explorative research adds to the New Zealand 
R&D incentive body of knowledge.  
3.2 Historical Overview / Recent Past 
After a big drop in productivity and living standards through the early 1980‟s, New Zealand 
engaged in an ambitious process of structural reform (Stillman et al., 2008). Despite these 
efforts, the disparity in labour productivity persistently increased through the 1990‟s (De 
Serres et al., 2014). However, a number of remedies were suggested as means to increase 
R&D spending. The suggested remedies consisted of an update in accounting standards 
regarding R&D and several R&D legislative changes.   
New Zealand‟s R&D journey has been marked by several changes in legislation. R&D tax 
provisions have existed in New Zealand since the 1970‟s. Section 144 of the Income Tax Act 
1976 (ITA 1976) permitted a deduction for scientific research expenditure, though, R&D was 
not technically “scientific research” and had to be considered for deductibility under 
the broad provision of section 104. The Income Tax Act 1994 (ITA 1994) section DJ 9 
similarly allowed for scientific research deductions for R&D purposes (s. BD 2 is the general 
provision to allow deductibility). Section DJ 9A of the ITA 1994 which had applied from 
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2001-2002 income year allowed further deductions on exemption from the capital limitation 
under section BD 2(2)(e) of the ITA1994. 
While interest grew in R&D, New Zealand‟s R&D performance in terms of R&D spending 
remained significantly substandard relative to comparable Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries such as Australia. This led to increased 
consideration of the OECD recommendations and the implementation of a tax incentive for 
R&D. New Zealand‟s thirteen-year taxation rewrite project lead to the emergence of the ITA 
1994, the Income Tax Act (ITA 2004) and afterwards the Income Tax Act 2007 (ITA 2007).  
R&D related sections included DB 25-27 and DB 33-35, which gave rise to the R&D Tax 
Credit. This change in legislation was in part led by commissioned research, which had 
encouraged the creation of a R&D Tax Credit and urged the New Zealand Government to 
contemplate creating a Tax Credit for R&D (Sawyer, 2005).  
On 25 July 2006, then Minister of Finance Sir Michael Cullen and Minister of Revenue 
Honorary Peter Dunne announced their support for the creation of the R&D Tax Credit in a 
business tax review discussion document (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, Para 3.9-3.10). This 
Parliamentary document reviewed possible initiatives for improving the New Zealand 
economy. The document clearly conveyed the Ministers‟ support of investment in R&D, 
suggesting that an R&D Tax Credit concession may level New Zealand‟s R&D spending and 
uplift New Zealand‟s ranking among other OECD countries. Their opinions were in support 
of R&D investment in paragraph 3.9: “The Government considers that there are wider 
benefits to New Zealand when businesses invest in R&D, export market development and 
enhancing skills in the workforce”. As well as their support for the R&D Tax Credit in 
particular in paragraph 3.10: “These activities could be further supported by way of tax 
concessions, and, in relation to R&D at least, there is evidence that tax credits can be a more 
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effective way of supporting these activities than discretionary assistance”. The R&D Tax 
Credit incentive creation was discussed in an Officials‟ Issues Paper (Inland Revenue & 
Treasury, 2006, Para 1.4) which also included possible designs for a R&D Tax Credit and 
emphasised that the New Zealand R&D Tax Credit should resemble that of Australia‟s in 
order to compete with Australia in terms of R&D investment from multi-national 
organisations. 
The R&D Tax Credit legislation was presented to Parliament in 2007. The Finance and 
Expenditure Committee (FEC) received submissions containing 73 issues on the proposed 
legislation (Dunne, 2007, p.33). The large number of submissions received and the 
consideration in those documents conveyed an avid interest in the R&D Tax Credit from 
many businesses and research entities. As the R&D Tax Credit would be available for 
practically any firm undertaking R&D that meets the criteria for the credit, the most 
highlighted issue entailed whether or not the credit‟s scope had grounds for sustainability. 
Heath (2002) argues that the premise of the R&D Tax Credit existing on a temporary basis 
would hinder real increases in R&D spending. Therefore, much caution or “tentative steps”, 
as Sawyer describes (2005), were taken in drafting New Zealand‟s R&D Tax Credit to 
diminish the need for future changes to the regime and to portray the scheme as lasting. 
However, given that a review would occur within three years of the R&D Tax Credit, this 
may have slightly distorted immediate investment.   
The enactment of the R&D Tax Credit occurred under Part LH of the ITA 2007.  In 2007, 
the New Zealand Government, (at the time led by the Labour Party), announced a 15 per cent 
R&D tax-credit effective from the 2008 income year. The R&D Tax Credit was announced 
with the hope that it would help New Zealand generate additional R&D, increase productivity 
and gain a more competitive position in the international marketplace (The Treasury, 2008, 
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p.9). On 17 May 2007, the „Business Tax Reform – R&D fact sheet‟ released by Inland 
Revenue Department as part of the 2007 Budget explained the dynamics of qualification for 
the R&D Tax Credit.
4
 Further details on the R&D Tax Credit were released in an Inland 
Revenue Tax Information Bulletin (2008). The document delved further into the 
documentation requirements for businesses wanting to apply for the credit in the 2008-2009 
years onwards. This requirement led to businesses upgrading their systems to ensure they 
qualify and report accurately on their R&D spend after the Bill was passed in late 2007 
(Robinson, 2009, p.16). 
However, early in October 2008, due to a change in government and despite the potential of 
the R&D Tax Credit, the Tax Credit was repealed after being in place for under a year. Some 
have considered this “wasteful” (Hembry, 2008); this was especially so as the setup costs had 
already been sunk. Overall, the decision to repeal the credit came as somewhat of a surprise, 
especially considering that the removal of this tax incentive was from a political 
party associated with being “pro-business” (Chapman Tripp, 2008).  
The National Party released a special report which announced the Party‟s desire to repeal the 
R&D Tax Credit on the basis that the design of the credit was substandard. Uncertainty of 
real benefit, difficulty in making financial arrangements (budgeting), and the credit‟s 
ineffectiveness at generating new R&D and merely compensating those already engaged in 
R&D activities were the main areas of concern (Inland Revenue, 2008). The explanatory note 
of the Taxation (Urgent Measures and Annual Rates) Bill explained:  
“The Government’s objective in repealing the tax credit is to move towards a 
broad-based low-rate tax system, which will improve the quality of investment 
and reduce distortions. Removing the R&D tax credit will also partially fund 
                                                          
4
 See Inland Revenue Department Tax information Bulletin: Volume 20(3) (April 2008) pages 37-64. 
19 
 
the reduction in personal tax rates. The Government considers the benefits of 
reducing tax rates are certain, whereas the benefits of the R&D tax credit are 
less certain. The Government is concerned that much of the credit will fund 
R&D that would have occurred in any case, the compliance costs associated 
with claiming the credit are high and that the credit will be paid out on 
standard operating expenditure re-characterised as R&D related 
expenditure.”  
The New Zealand community also found this announcement unexpected as well as 
unwarranted and there followed a wave of discontent when the freshly voted National led 
Government fulfilled the repeal of the R&D Tax Credit in December 2008. Prime Minister 
Helen Clark and Science and Technology Minister Honorary Pete Hodgson declared: “Across 
New Zealand people are astounded at National‟s short-term and short-sighted policies which 
would take away support for fast-growing research-driven companies and industries” (Otago 
Daily News, 2008). Tax experts and chief executives across the country have commented that 
the only way to accurately assess the regime‟s effectiveness in the true long-term is if it had 
remained for more than a single income year (Robinson, 2009).  
Much of the debate among politicians was recapped on the media. While these sources 
generally hold a lower degree of rigour and are considered less resilient compared to 
academic research, some of the comments obtained from media sources were considered in 
this research. This is because it had become clear that this repeal was driven by politics as the 
decision to repeal the Tax Credit came forth from a change in government; it was put down to 
politicization rather than sound economic reasoning. Therefore, while tentatively approached, 
the researcher is to cast some attention upon the media-related outspokenness from political 
parties and tax practitioners, as these sources are indicative of political atmospheres 
surrounding the repeal.  
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As mentioned above, accurately assessing the regime‟s effectiveness in one income year was 
considered unfair. This stance was taken by Chief Executive of Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association, John Whalley, who believed that while New Zealand needed the tax cuts, the 
funding for the cuts had come from the wrong places (referring to the discontinued R&D Tax 
Credit). Whalley discredited National Prime Minister John Key‟s statement below claiming 
that it was “daft” considering that the Tax Credit had only been around for the sum total of 
one income year.  
Whalley‟s comment was in response to Prime Minister Key‟s assumption concerning the 
yielded benefit (or lack thereof) of the R&D Tax Credit. The statement in question 
documenting Key‟s reluctance towards continuing the R&D Tax Credit is as follows: “It's 
clear that the Tax Credit has created a lot of business for tax accountants and tax advisers, but 
evidence of real increases in R&D is harder to find.” (Key, NZ Herald, 2008). Whalley 
further lamented that National‟s decision to axe the Tax Credit would put New Zealand in a 
worse position. “New Zealand was once at the bottom of the OECD in terms of policy 
support for R&D spending, this change will put us back in last place.” (Whalley, NZ Herald, 
2008).  
However, the technical reasons for the repeal by National appear to be fivefold. They include 
spiralling fiscal cost behind the incentive, the increase in compliance cost of hiring advisors 
and tax practitioners involved in filing returns, policy incompatibility with regards to being 
opposite to the objective of moving towards a broad-base low-rate system, redundancy in that 
the activities of R&D would likely occur whether or not the incentive is there, and lastly, 
having firms employ recharacterisation to make their expenditures fit the eligibility criteria. 
(Bowler-Smith, 2014, p.8)   
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Following the removal of the R&D Tax Credit, the Government announced a shift of focus 
on Business R&D with a total allocation of $321 million for new initiatives within Research 
Science & Technology (RS&T) over the following four years (The Beehive, 2010). This 
funding offered fiscal support towards high-performing, science, research and technology 
driven firms and was distributed in four main ways. As summarised by a Tax Insights 
Factsheet by KPMG (KPMG, 2008, p.1). First, the Technology Development Grant aimed to 
support R&D programmes in New Zealand firms with a strong record of substantial R&D 
investment in high-value products and services. It provided funding equal to 20 per cent of a 
firm‟s R&D budget, up to $2.4 million a year, for 3 years. Secondly, the Technology Transfer 
Vouchers, which were aimed at helping firms with a lack of internal R&D capability in a 
specific area to commission, research from accredited organisations. It provided 50 per cent 
funding towards business R&D projects. The vouchers were to be project-based and were 
worth between $100,000 and $1 million. Thirdly, the Technology New Zealand - Technology 
Fund, which provided support for potential high growth companies to undertake R&D 
projects to develop new technology products, processes or services. A number of Grants were 
available on demand that generally provide 50 per cent project funding. Fourthly, the 
Technology New Zealand - Capability Fund. This funding was available to support 
development of R&D skills within business (e.g. Mentors).  
The following year‟s Budget announcement (The Treasury, 2011) took place on 2 May 2011. 
The Prime Minister had placed science and innovation at the heart of the economic growth 
agenda. The ministry of science and innovation (MSI) was created to bring together different 
functions to one organisation to deliver better results. The Government announced that there 
was a rigorous re-prioritisation process of RS&T. This freed up $109.8 million over four 
years to support government priorities. The focus that year became supporting new schemes 
to lift business R&D following pressure from outside entities to address this.  
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The Minister of RS&T positioned a clearer set of priorities for future investment, which he 
claimed was conducive to economic growth that included: “developing a coherent set of 
business R&D support schemes that work across the spectrum of business needs.” (The 
Treasury, 2011, p.5). This was to achieve more transparency and be strategically possible 
within the means of government policy, and believed to lead towards the wider goal of 
achieving economic growth. It also meant that many worthwhile business R&D projects 
would not be funded. The Government justified this by hypothesizing that firms may 
decrease their interest in R&D spending and the Government may lose the drive to quicken 
investment in R&D if excess demands persisted in the business R&D schemes (The Treasury, 
2011, p.8).  
In the 2012 Budget announcement (The Treasury, 2012) released on 29 June 2012, the MSI 
was working towards three general outcomes: “greater prosperity, improved health and well-
being, and a healthy environment.” (The Treasury, 2012, p.3). The four year budget plan 
addresses the fundamental issue New Zealand is facing in terms of very low levels of 
business expenditure on research and development (BERD), compared to the OECD average. 
The report describes BERD as having close links with productivity and economic growth and 
states “New Zealand‟s BERD is 0.52 per cent of GDP compared to the OECD average of 1.2 
per cent of GDP.” (The Treasury, 2012, p.6). These figures shed light on the need, at the 
time, to refocus on incentivising business to increase their investment in R&D. Especially in 
the high value manufacturing and services sector (HVMS). This is attempted by creating an 
entity named an Advanced Technology Institute (ATI). The report also states: “in light of 
recent evaluations of the Tech New Zealand programmes, MSI is developing policy options 
for re-designing tools that encourage business R&D. This work is at an early stage; so it is 
too soon to know if changes can be made within existing appropriations or if they will require 
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changes between appropriations” (The Treasury, 2012, p.16). This would eventually lead to 
the start of the discussion on which incentives work best to achieve these outcomes.  
In the 2013 Budget announcement (The Treasury, 2013) released on 5 July 2013, the 
Government decided on new R&D incentives to support innovation. Additional innovation 
funding brought new designs that declared a shift to a market-friendly approach. The 
Government included proposed the following changes to three existing research support 
programmes and an “incubator” programme (The Treasury, 2013, p.2):  
1. “The R&D Growth Grants (previously named Technology Development Grants) will 
be expanded. Eligibility criteria will be widened, and the subjective judgement stage 
by officials eliminated. These changes will make the programme simpler and more 
predictable.  
2. R&D Project Grants will be reduced in size, to partially fund the expanded Growth 
Grants. The new Project Grants will have lower rates of public co-funding, and be 
targeted to firms that are new to R&D.  
3. R&D Student Grants, supporting students to work in research active businesses, will 
continue, but with a greater focus on the benefit to the student.  
4. A new repayable Grant for capital-intensive start-ups will be trialled, working in 
conjunction with current incubator programmes.”  
Moreover, in relation to black-hole R&D expenditure and in an effort to provide an 
environment that supports business R&D, the 2013 Budget announced proposed changes to 
six areas of black-hole expenditure. This was in order to permit further areas of black-hole 
expenditure to be deductible for tax purposes. 
These updates were welcomed by the Treasury on the basis that the simple R&D Growth 
Grants would provide more certainty for businesses. These Grants would be administered by 
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Callaghan Innovation (CI) - a government agency who asserts that it possess “the talent, 
resources, knowledge and connections to drive better integration, co-ordinate networking and 
get value out of gaps and opportunities across the innovation system” (Callaghan, 2012). In 
December 2012, CI was introduced by the Crown in a bill titled Callaghan Innovation Bill 
(2012) and under Subpart 1 - section 13(1) (a-j) the functions of Callaghan Innovation which 
replaces the ATI were comprehensively established in the bill.  
R&D incentives started to take form further in the 2014 Budget where the most significant of 
the tax changes, and one that is foreshadowed by the progression of budget updates, was the 
announcement of two initiatives in relation to R&D expenditure. The first initiative is 
confirmation of a policy that will allow R&D intensive start-up companies to R&D Cash Out 
all or some of their tax losses rather than carrying them forward until they become profit-
making ventures. The second initiative was to further address black-hole R&D expenditure 
by allowing all capitalised expenditure on depreciable intangible property to be deducted over 
time. That is by allowing a one off deduction for capitalised expenditure on intangible 
property, which is written off for accounting purposes. These initiatives would add an 
estimated extra $58 million towards R&D tax deductions by start-up firms (Inland Revenue, 
2014, p.1-2). 
The latest development since then is the new law - Taxation (Annual Rates for 2015-2016, 
Research and Development, and Remedial Matters) Act. This law addresses the previously 
mentioned “black-hole” expenditure and cashing-out of losses for R&D expenditure. The 
proposed changes focus on R&D intensive start-up companies, and aim to lessen their risk of 
encountering market failures arising from the current tax treatment of losses. The Act permits 
tax loss-making research and development (R&D) companies to cash out their losses. An 
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incentive created to allow a temporary timing benefit for loss-making companies (Inland 
Revenue, 2015a, p.2-3). 
In terms of the “black-hole” expenditure, the Act explains that the proposed amendments aim 
to achieve the following:  
“Reduce distortions discouraging investment in R&D caused by current tax 
law, under which development expenditure incurred subsequent to the 
recognition of an intangible asset for accounting purposes is generally unable 
to be deducted for income tax purposes. The proposed amendments seek to 
allow capitalised development expenditure to be either deducted over time as 
depreciation (where the R&D results in a depreciable intangible asset) or 
deducted upon the intangible asset being written off for accounting purposes 
(where the R&D does not result in a depreciable intangible asset.)” (Inland 
Revenue, 2015a, p.4-5)  
However, the issues that still exist include the low R&D investment spanning over many 
years, which still poses an important problem, yet remains un-tackled. For example, the 
notion of the Government picking “winners” by attributing the greatest amount of funding 
towards companies that already perform well within the paradigm that wealth would create 
further wealth (Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, 2014). In addition, the issue of 
whether these grants really lead to increased and new R&D investment or simply provide this 
funding to projects that would have occurred in any case (Robinson, 2009). 
Shaun Hendy, (physics Professor at University of Auckland) is an open supporter of the R&D 
Tax Credit and comments: "It's only growing at about the rate that we've seen for the last few 
decades so it's not like we've seen a supercharge in business R&D. There's positive trends in 
our ICT sector - computers and software-as-a-service - we've seen a big growth in research 
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and development spending there but we're actually seeing a decline in spending in our 
manufacturing sector and in our primary sector” (NZ Herald, 2015). Hendy continues to state 
that, in his opinion, the best way for the Government to increase R&D spending is to re-
establish tax-credits. The media releases and submissions arising in this period imply that the 
R&D incentives have yet to elevate New Zealand‟s R&D performance to where it needs to be 
for New Zealand‟s R&D spending to come into parallel with other OECD countries. 
More evidence suggesting the countrywide reluctance to accept the removal of the R&D Tax 
Credit stems from New Zealand based research undertaken in 2009. Robinson (2009) 
undertook research that centred on the old R&D Tax Credit and asked practitioners what their 
reactions and opinions were as to the removal of the credit. Robinson noted that there had 
been no litigation on the topic of R&D in New Zealand. Robinson hypothesized that this is 
the case for one of two reasons: firstly, the provisions were clear enough and the definitions 
concerning each research and development were relatively easy to work out. However, he 
also stated that the inexistence of cases could instead reflect the lack of interest in R&D.  
A 2013/14 Annual review of CI has summarised that in the two years since its launch, CI has 
carried out almost 1000 R&D projects for over 300 different businesses. It has approved 
nearly 1,500 R&D Grants for almost 1000 businesses, placed over 700 students in nearly 300 
businesses, and assisted over 100 companies with innovation engagement plans for their 
product development strategy and company growth. However, as of recently, CI has been at 
odds with two bodies: Trends Publishing International and Gameloft.  
On 12 May 2014, an article published on the Callaghan Innovation website announced that 
CI had approved fifteen high tech companies for the R&D Project Grants. The companies had 
been chosen on the basis that they have shown “a strong commitment to research and 
development conducted in New Zealand” (Callaghan Innovation Website, 2014a). Trends 
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Publishing International was among the fifteen selected companies. Trends received a three-
year Growth Grant on 31 March 2014. The total amount received was a total of $313,536.70. 
However, on 17 December 2014 CI released a statement that announced the suspension of a 
R&D Growth Grant given to Trends. This follows auditing Trends‟ funding claims and 
questioning the legitimacy of Trends‟ claims against the approved funding, this ended in CI 
notifying the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) (Callaghan Innovation Website, 2014a).  
The conflict began when a Big 4 accounting firm released a report that showed possible 
breaches of the grant. The company had projected false or misleading information concerning 
staff costs associated with R&D. The company further had no comprehensive project 
management documentation, and had made expenditure claims that they are unentitled to 
such as director's life insurance premiums. The Callaghan Innovation Act (2012), which 
came into effect on 11 December 2012, puts forth that breaches to the terms of Growth Grant 
funding agreements may incur remedial action, contract termination and the requirement to 
repay funds paid plus interest.  
Trends soon suffered a cash crisis and therefore made a proposal under Part 14 of the 
Companies Act 1993 (CA 1993) to compromise their debts; a majority of creditors approved 
this compromise at a meeting held on 22 May 2016. However, CI led legal action against 
Trends on 7 September 2016 alongside three other challenging creditors that voted against 
the proposal (Advicewise People Ltd v. Trends Publishing International Ltd, 2016) on the 
basis that the proposal was not valid and the resulting compromise is not binding on the 
affected creditors. CI has won this round of legal proceedings against Trends. This may bring 
forth that all grant recipients are regularly monitored by CI to deter fraudulent claims and 
ensure the intent of the policy is met. Trends brought a counterclaim against CI for “unlawful 
suspension and later termination” and demanded damages in terms of defamation to the 
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Trends business, brand and staff. The counterclaim has been set down for hearing in 
November 2016. 
In another instance, CI encountered predicament regarding a previously awarded grant. 
Similar to the above scenario, an article posted on 27 February 2014 on CI website 
announced Gameloft as among 19 other high tech New Zealand businesses that were selected 
to receive the R&D Growth Grant. The company had shut down operations in their Auckland 
subsidiary leaving staff out of work. The company is yet to be put into liquidation. The issue 
is the status of whether the grant amount or part of it could be paid back. CI is seeking a legal 
opinion as to whether they are entitled to the outstanding amount. No official statements have 
been released on the CI website in relation to Gameloft as of yet. 
The examples above raised key issues for the Education and Science select committee:  
“The policy question of whether grant making should be automatic once the 
criteria are met, or whether a more discretionary approach might make better 
use of resources. Secondly, a number of operational issues arise, including the 
need to manage transnational company acquisitions, the transparency of 
applicants’ information, and the relevance of their research, in a way that 
makes the best use of available resources” (Parliament, 2015). 
 These situations may also highlight similar conclusions to those which Robinson (2009) had 
attributed to the lack of litigation. Perhaps the emergence of the litigation suggests increased 
engagement. Alternatively, perhaps this litigation goes to show that there has been increased 
complexity as of recent that has caused conflicts. This offers insight towards the degree of 
success of the current regimes. 
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3.3 New Zealand R&D Performance Relative to OECD  
The latest R&D survey conducted by Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) and the Ministry of 
Science, Research and Technology (MoSR&T) showed that while business expenditure on 
R&D increased, our GDP has increased by more (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). As a result, 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP has decreased from the 2012 survey. Since New 
Zealand first reported its R&D spending as a percentage of GDP to the OECD in 1989 and 
between the SNZ surveys taken between 2002-2014, New Zealand has always spent between 
1.16 – 1.27 per cent of its GDP on R&D. This produces the New Zealand average of 1.22 per 
cent for GDP spent on R&D, and is a poor performance compared the OECD R&D spending 
average, which has been over 2 per cent of GDP since 1982 and ranges from 2.19-2.40 per 
cent between 2002 to 2014 (OECD Factsheet, 2014). 
Robinson (2009) also concluded that when there was a lack of R&D incentives in New 
Zealand, the accuracy of New Zealand‟s figures could be called into question given the lack 
of motivation for New Zealand businesses to track and classify their R&D activities. 
Nonetheless, it remains an alarming prospect that the aforementioned figures would put New 
Zealand‟s performance as ranking 29
th
 out of 35 OECD countries for R&D spending as  a 
percentage of GDP. Given that expenditure on R&D is said to be a “key indicator of 
countries‟ innovative effort”, this suggest that not only is New Zealand a weak contender 
when compared to OECD countries but that maybe New Zealand‟s innovative efforts are 
lacking and would hence hinder New Zealand‟s goals of achieving prosperity through 
continued economic growth (OECD Factsheet, 2014).  
Table 3.1 below shows New Zealand‟s R&D spending as a percentage of GDP over a period 
of 8 years. The 2008 figure shows an increase of 17 per cent from 2006‟s figure. This 
increase seems to continue into the following two years where in 2010 the figure increases 
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from 2008 by 13 per cent. The trend continues into the following two years and shows an 
increase of 10 per cent in 2012 from 2010. However, in the 2014 year survey the figure 
increases by less. 
Table 3.1 – „NZ‟s R&D Spending as a percentage of GDP Spanning 8 years‟ 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Total R&D 
Expenditure 
2.1 Billion 2.4 Billion 
 
2.6 Billion 2.6 Billion 
Total R&D Business 
Expenditure 
900 Million 1 Billion 1.2 Billion 1.2 Billion 







While the trend portrayed New Zealand as increasing its R&D spending as a percentage of 
R&D, the facts remain to prove that while a step in the right direction, much improvement is 
needed still. As a comparative outlook, in 2010 New Zealand‟s R&D spending as a 
percentage of GDP was 1.3 per cent. While that figure may be a step forward in terms of it 
being higher than the previous two years indicating advancement, it is yet well below the 
OECD average of 2.38 per cent. This shows that New Zealand‟s R&D spending is far from 
level with the OECD average and may indicate that a drastic change may need to occur to 
improve New Zealand‟s performance. 
Since the change of government and the removal of the R&D Tax Credit in 2008, the 
National Party have changed their stance in terms of addressing the issue of New Zealand 
underperforming in R&D spending compared to other country members in the OECD. 
Initially in 2006, the National Party stated, “The focus on R&D spending as a percentage of 
GDP is useful but not the whole story. Creating economic growth is not as simple as 
increasing R&D spending”. However, the National Party seems to emphasise increasing 
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP. In the 2012 budget statement, the National party 
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channelled their disappointment in the gap between New Zealand and OECD R&D 
performance toward designing new incentives to support business R&D.  
The National Party has since equipped CI with the objective of supporting business R&D 
investment to reach 1 per cent of GDP by 2025; in the 2013/14 year, the proportion was 0.58 
per cent. Given New Zealand‟s low rate of business investment is a barrier to achieving this 
target; it is no surprise that National now wishes to terminate this barrier (Parliament, 2015). 
 3.5 Summary 
Arguably, New Zealand has remained to be out of step with its fellow OECD country 
members to have only recently adopted an R&D incentive. New Zealand has since introduced 
a variety of incentives that were utilised to increase New Zealand‟s R&D spending. New 
Zealand has facilitated an R&D Tax Credit, R&D Grants, and as of recently an R&D Cash 
Out of losses option. Despite the short lifespan of each of these R&D incentives, the New 
Zealand journey is one worthy of exploration. The overview in this chapter reveals a notable 
lack of qualitative research that examines all R&D incentives in the New Zealand setting, a 
gap that this research attempts to address. This research aims to understand which R&D 
incentive is likely to be most effective in the New Zealand context, in terms of equity, 
certainty, convenience, and economy. 
While the R&D Cash Out option is still in its infancy, a tentative analysis will be used to 
study the R&D Cash Out incentive for the first time, to the researcher‟s knowledge. Due to 
the Cash Out R&D incentive‟s recent assent as law, this research merely aims to make 
conjectures in terms of the effectiveness of this option compared with the other available 
options to New Zealand. In addition, the lack of qualitative research on R&D Tax Credits 
leaves a gap in the literature. Moreover, since the removal of the R&D Tax Credit in New 
Zealand, there has been significantly less research on this incentive and therefore revisiting it 
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provides a good contribution to the literature. The last incentive studied is the new R&D 
Callaghan Innovation Grant incentive. This incentive has been used in New Zealand since 
2013; though, limited research has been conducted on this incentive in New Zealand despite 





CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research development, design and theoretical framework, 
methodology and research tools operated to address the research questions listed below in 
section 4.2. The literature review highlights the motivations for the researcher to undertake 
this research and argues that there is limited qualitative research that looks into all past and 
current New Zealand R&D incentives collectively.  
There is no academic research, to the researcher‟s knowledge, which exists on the R&D Cash 
Out incentive. This is reasonable given that the incentive is only in its infancy and has never 
been used overseas. There are limitations in being able to add significantly to the body of 
research on this incentive since the R&D Cash Out incentive has not been in place for an 
adequate period to be sufficiently studied. However, for the same reason the researcher 
wishes to initiate research in this area to provide early understanding of the incentive and a 
foundation for future research to build on this understanding.  
The earliest R&D Grant recorded in the Callaghan Innovation database was first awarded in 
2013, yet research remains woefully scarce. This lack of research forms a motivation for the 
researcher to conduct this research as it provides an opportunity to contribute to the literature 
by remedying this gap. An extensive amount of research exists on the R&D Tax Credit, 
however it is mostly quantitative . Given there is considerably less qualitative research 
available on the R&D Tax Credit, this is also a strong motivation to conduct qualitative 
research on this incentive and add variety to the existing literature.  
Section 4.2 of this chapter lists the research questions to be explored in this study. Section 4.3 
describes the theoretical framework that guides this research project. Section 4.4 presents the 
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qualitative methodology employed to address the research questions. In section 4.5 a brief 
summary of the eligible evaluation frameworks is given, explaining the strengths and 
limitations of each approach. Section 4.6 describes the use of Adam Smith‟s (1776) 
principles for this research. The research tools used in this research project are discussed in 
Section 4.7. Finally, section 4.8 provides an overall summary of this chapter. 
4.2 Research Questions 
This project seeks to evaluate which of the three New Zealand R&D incentives is likely to be 
considered the most effective. Exploratory research is conducted, using Adam Smith‟s (1776) 
Principles of Good Taxation as the standard for comparison across the three incentives at 
hand. 
This inquiry will involve the following main processes:   
 Exploration of each incentive‟s merits and shortfalls individually;  
 A comparative analysis of selected R&D incentives; and    
 A critical evaluation concluding which incentive(s) is/are likely most effective  
This research project proposes three research questions: 
RQ1: Why did each incentive come into being? (Policy intentions) 
RQ2: How does each incentive fare when benchmarked against Adam Smith’s 
Principles of Good Taxation?  
RQ3: Which incentive(s) is/are likely most effective according to the above 
assessments? 
To answer the first question, a literature review was conducted in chapter 3 to document 
historical interactions leading the creation of the incentives. Additionally, an information 
table synthesised in the discussion section (chapter 5) is created in order to capture the 
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information available on each incentive in a single snapshot. This involves using four main 
criteria that emerged from the literature review as representing most significant areas of R&D 
incentive discussion (e.g. eligibility criteria, amount of incentive available, etc.). This step  
allows visual comparison of the differences and similarities between the incentives.  
The second research question is answered by gathering critical observations and comments 
from the first two steps and illustrating the understanding gained in table format (Table 5.1) 
which benchmarks the findings against Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation. 
The second table in Chapter 5 (Table 5.2) also visually depicts where each incentive stands 
when cross-comparison takes place among the incentives.  
Research question three is answered following the creation of the second table which 
benchmarks the incentives against Adam Smith‟s principles. A rudimentary scale will be 
used to assess which incentive(s) is/are likely considered the most effective. Further 
explanations as to how and why these approaches were chosen and deemed appropriate by 
the researcher will be provided at the end of this chapter.  
4.3 Theoretical Framework 
4.3.1 Institutional Theory   
An institutional theoretical framework is used in this thesis. The researcher utilises this 
framework to examine the influence of political and social institutions in New Zealand and to 
evaluate the impact of institutional factors on policy development in relation to R&D 
incentives. The adoption of the institutional framework enables exploration of how the State, 
interest groups and individuals influence the tax policy area, and the degree to which policy 
outcomes reflect the preferences and influence of these groups.  
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There is a large body of research on institutional theory but no one, unified view of what this 
framework specifically involves. Scott (1987) explains that there is a wide-range of 
definitions available for what constitutes institutional theory, and even for what constitutes an 
institution. Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p.2) explain that institutional theory is concerned with 
the entire spectrum of political and social institutions which contribute greatly to shaping 
political “actors” in terms of the way these political actors then define their interest and exert 
their influence on other groups. Institutions include many forms and even government 
structures. North (1990, p.3) explains that institutions are systems which provide constraints 
which shape how humans interact. Considering these comments, and for the purposes of this 
research, the New Zealand Government will be treated as a formal institution and taxpayers 
as a social institution.  
Agency theory supplements the above framework as one mode of clarifying the motives 
behind the interactions, which occur between the previously mentioned groups and policy 
formation. Agency theory describes a relationship in which the principal delegates work to an 
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). As policy formation is a process that transpires within the context 
of society, appropriate emphasis on the meanings and exchanges of institutional players is 
necessary to enable awareness of the wide range of factors that have led to the current 
outcomes. In adopting the institutional framework there is a goal to „clarify‟ the situation in 
New Zealand using a critical realism lens to highlight the contribution and the motivations of 
institutional variables in generating policy outputs.  
The researcher recognises that alternative theoretical frameworks may also have the potential 
to unlock insights into this study, however, the researcher believes that institutional theory 
provides the greatest potential in unlocking insights for the exploratory study at hand. This is 
attributed to institutional theory‟s ability to provide guidance to the researcher in considering 
political and social implications of interactions within and outside institutions. Consequently, 
37 
 
it was deemed appropriate to apply institutional theory as the theoretical framework for the 
analysis undertaken in this thesis due to its solid association with the field of political science. 
Marriott (2010) endorsed the adoption of institutional frameworks as facilitating analysis of 
the degree to which policy outputs reflect the influence of interest groups and individuals, 
specifically their “impact on the tax policy area.” (Marriott, 2010, p.26). Political 
institutionalism in particular has been used for the analytical purposes of this research as 
R&D in itself is largely political. This is highlighted in the literature review in chapter 2 and 
illustrated by the removal of the R&D Tax Credit, despite its promise, due to a change of 
government. This understanding is further exemplified by research undertaken by political 
institutionalism scholar Steinmo (1993, p.10), who relays that government and the structure 
of political institutions are key influences in taxation policy change. This perhaps suggests 
that such policy decisions are backed by, - and reflect - political agendas and economic 
reasoning. Steinmo (1993) also highlights the Government‟s susceptibility to agency. Hence 
the chosen framework will be supplemented by agency theory. Eisenhardt (1989) describes 
agency theory as a relationship concerning an agent and a principal. The principal issues 
work to the agent who then preforms that work. Likewise, the researcher utilises agency 
theory in this research by assuming that the tax advisors (the agent) work for the best interest 
of the company in which they operate (the principal) by advising taxpayers on the tax laws 
passed by the Government.  
It is important to mention that this thesis does not attempt to analyse whether increased R&D 
spending does actually lead to innovation, as there is recent thorough research that explores 
this area (e.g. Köhler et al. 2012). Rather, this thesis attempts to specifically single out the 
past and current New Zealand R&D incentives, cross-compare them and decipher which 
R&D incentive is likely to be considered the most effective following a 3-step evaluation 
(mentioned above under section 4.2). This evaluation highlights the R&D experiences of 
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New Zealand leading to the current policy designs, emphasising the underlying principles to 
the directions taken in drafting the policies and assessing whether the rationales discovered 
coincide with what New Zealand‟s business environment needs or wants.  
4.4 Research Approach  
This section outlines the research approach undertaken in this research. As highlighted in the 
literature review section, most research concerning R&D incentives across time is associated 
with the use of a quantitative research approach. For example, Bernstein, 1986; Dagenais et 
al, 1997; Bloom et al, 2002; Köhler et al. 2012 all employ a quantitative research approach in 
their work. With only some qualitative research recently emerging in New Zealand, there is a 
recognizable gap in R&D incentive literature using qualitative methodology. Further, as 
mentioned previously the aims of this study are to evaluate which New Zealand R&D 
incentive is likely to be considered the most effective by benchmarking all the incentives 
against Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation. This concerns research of an 
exploratory nature, hence, an investigation utilising qualitative methods was deemed 
appropriate.  
King and Horrocks (2010) identifya significant difference between quantitative and 
qualitative research. Unlike qualitative research, quantitative research demands a statistically 
representative sample as the subject of the study in order to claim generalisability. In 
qualitative research more emphasis exists on the sample representing a variety of participants. 
This is to facilitate for finding meaningful differences in experiences. As this project 
concerns social and political contexts and influences, there is a lack of need to find a rational 
or empirical result that tends to be detached from the mentioned contexts. Rather, the 
emphasis is on the exchanges between institutions and processes. For example, the exchanges 
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between the Government and the taxpayers, or between Callaghan Innovation and the 
Government.   
Further, the ontological stance taken by the researcher is that of a critical realist. The data 
collected for the purposes of this research is perceived through the lens of critical realism. 
These ontological beliefs identify that reality exists as a concrete structure, but also recognise 
that there is room for social construction to build on perceptions of that reality.  
A researcher undertaking the epistemological stance of objectivism and the ontological stance 
of realism embraces positivism generally. A positivist researcher would consider the world an 
entity that exists regardless of our view of it (Crotty, 1998, p.8). This view is considered 
“naïve” by Guba and Lincoln (2005, p.195-203) who criticized the simplicity of this view of 
realism. Williams and May (1996, p.27) similarly argue against positivism, yet, they 
nonetheless recognise it as an extremely influential theoretical perspective. They state that 
positivism is “one of the heroic failures of modern philosophy”. The researcher agrees that 
the positivist stance is in great contrast to our idiosyncratic world. On the other hand, the 
other extreme is non-positivism or interpretivism. This framework focuses on understanding 
social reality based on subjective interpretations of the researcher. Unlike positivism, this 
framework stems from inductive reasoning and holds that a researcher filters their 
interpretation of a social reality through their own view, beliefs and knowledge (Carroll and 
Swatman, 2000, p.237). That is that the researcher cannot be completely objective or 
unbiased from the subjects under study but rather view reality from a subjective lens. The 
researcher also takes this stance in the present research as this model allows for “how” and 
“why” questions to be asked in an attempt to understand the actual and complex “reality” 
which surrounds the relationships under analysis (McKerchar, 2010).   
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Bordens and Abbott (2008, p.3) draw a parallel between research and science as research 
does not only concern revealing new knowledge but research further involves thinking and 
viewing the world. Identifying gaps in previous literature looking at R&D incentives and 
considering my own motivation for this research, the paradigm chosen to conduct the 
research is guided by critical realism, a paradigm that combines transcendental realism with 
critical naturalism (Archer et al., 2013, p.3). McKerchar (2010) recognised that the critical 
realism paradigm (sometimes referred to as “post positivism”) is aligned midway between 
positivism and interpretivism.  
4.5 Evaluation Framework  
This section outlines and justifies the benchmarking system chosen for evaluation purposes of 
the research project. This project presents exploratory qualitative research as mentioned in 
the section above. Among the main aims of the study is to evaluate which of New Zealand‟s 
past and current R&D incentives are likely to be considered the most effective. This process 
is carried out by evaluating the incentives facilitating Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of 
Good Taxation. Alley and Duncan (2005) use a business metaphor to explain in simple terms 
the importance of adopting well-established principles to design a robust tax system. They 
liken utilising governing tax principles to guide the creation of a sound taxation system to 
vision, mission and values. Alley and Duncan write, “The vision constitutes the purpose of 
taxation. The mission identifies the forms of taxation and the methods of administration, 
collection and enforcement. The principles equate to the values that underlie the tax system” 
(Para 10, p.582). These principles, which are used as governing standards in the process of 
creating a tax policy, shape the effectiveness of the resulting policy. Hence, this project uses 
benchmarks (governing principles) to evaluate the effectiveness of the past and current New 
Zealand R&D incentives. 
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In terms of choosing the particular evaluation principles for purposes of this project, the 
researcher recognises the existence of several evaluation frameworks that can be used to 
study R&D incentives. However, certain elements have been considered in choosing the 
evaluation framework for the thesis. Some evaluation frameworks that have the potential to 
offer insights into this exploratory research project are briefly mentioned in the subsections 
below. 
4.5.1 The Tax Working Group’s (TWG) Principles  
The Tax Working Group (TWG) wrote a report (2010) aimed to identify issues within the 
New Zealand tax system, which in the group‟s opinion required addressing. The group 
elaborated on options for reform focusing on six governing principles of a good tax system: 
efficiency; equity; integrity; fiscal cost; administrative cost; and coherence. The researcher 
deems the use of these principles appropriate for outlining what the overall tax system should 
look like (i.e. the big picture). They are, however, less applicable to the specialised area 
which this research investigates. Due to the thesis of this study research which explores one 
small area of tax policy (as opposed to the entire tax system as a whole), a “big picture” 
approach is less likely to be appropriate for the “small picture” detail under examination. 
While principles that the TWG use, such as equity, fiscal and administrative cost are 
applicable to R&D incentives as they determine the extent of sustainability the incentive (a 
key part of the survival of the incentive), other principles such as coherence and integrity are 
aimed at reviewing the tax system as a whole. Hence, the TWG criteria make sense for 
examining the entire tax system rather than examining three different ways of managing a 
small, yet important aspect being the R&D tax incentive. 
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4.5.2 Cedric Sandford’s Principles 
Sandford (1993) suggests three elements to a tax reform that leads to high performing tax 
system. The three elements include firstly, the extent to which the reform met the objectives 
of the policy makers. Secondly, the sustainability of the reforms, which has close nexus with 
certainty as one of the reluctances of practitioners to adopt the old R&D Tax Credit, was the 
concern that the Government was to repeal this incentive and inevitably, it did. Hence, this 
criterion is relevant to this topic. Thirdly, the magnitude of desirable or undesirable by-
products. This criterion has nexus with the integrity or coherence principles listed from the 
above example as this principle considers the possibility of fraud and how that would 
endanger the overall tax system. Again, this is looking at the issue with a „big picture‟ 
approach; however, the approach needed for this research is foundational and well 
established criteria to initiate research on a specific tax issue.  
4.5.3 Additional Principles 
Other principles have emerged over time from a standard text in the United States (Madeo et. 
al., 1995) including but not limited to: productivity, visibility, and political consideration. 
However, these principles are not universally used. Moreover, due to the limited scope of this 
thesis, there are constraints in being able to carry out research using many criteria for 
evaluation but rather (as mentioned previously) a need for succinct and long standing 
principles of good tax as a starting point for this research.  
Adam Smith‟s Principles: a frequently used framework for evaluation that is commonly used 
to describe excellent tax policy was founded by Adam Smith (1776) who authored The 
Wealth of Nations in which arose Smith‟s „canons of taxations‟ (also known as „Principles of 
Good Taxation‟). These canons included, equity, convenience, certainty, and economy. While 
these principles may be criticized for being out-dated, they are still very relevant as drawing 
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on these principles for evaluation purposes for this project offers a “catch-all” foundation as 
well as offering a manageable scope. This is because they are universal standards that have 
been applied to research many times over. These principles present the fundamentals of every 
effective tax system. This makes a great starting point for initiating research on New 
Zealand's past and current R&D incentives. Moreover, Smith‟s canons of tax are widely used 
these days by policy advisors across the political spectrum. Given that R&D is a political 
issue, this provides even more reason to assume Smith‟s principles for evaluation purposes of 
this research. 
4.6 Adam Smith’s Principles 
Adam Smith presented four principles of a model tax (also known as Canons of Good 
Taxation) in his book „An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations‟ published in 1776. The 
principles are equity, certainty, convenience and economy. According to Smith‟s framework 
(Smith, 1950) these principles are paramount to the construction of tax policy, as it is merely 
when upholding these principles that effective taxes are applied in a manner that fulfils the 
stated purposes of a tax or a tax system. The principles are briefly explained in sections 4.6.1-
4.6.4 below. 
4.6.1 Equity 
“The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
Government, as nearly as possible … in proportion to the revenue which they 
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state” (Smith, 1950, p.347) 
Smith‟s framework (1776) dictates that the first of the four maxims is largely based on equity 
and fairness as it deals with the distribution of tax burdens. This concept is built on the 
premise that tax contributions by taxpayers should be levied proportionally depending upon 
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the revenue they earn under the protection of the state. The principle of equity is based on the 
division of horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity means that those earning the 
same amount of income under the protection of the state should pay the same amount of tax, 
while vertical equity means that persons with the greater ability to pay should bear more of 
the overall tax burden (Greenheld, Hopper, Ritchie & Somerfield, 1998). Research 
undertaken in relation to governing tax principles in designing tax systems (Alley & Bentley, 
2005, p.586-588) finds that equity and fairness feature in at least eleven frameworks (For 
example: Smith, 1776; AICPA, 2001; James & Noble, 1997; ICAEW Tax Faculty, 1999; 
OECD (Ottawa), 1998; Jackson, 1994; Ridge & Smith, 1991; O‟Brien Report, 1982; Carter 
Report, 1966; Asprey Report, 1975). This principle will account for 25 per cent of the overall 
effectiveness of the incentives under examination.  
4.6.2 Certainty 
“The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not 
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, 
ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. 
Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the 
power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious 
contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or 
perquisite to himself”  (Smith, 1950, p.347) 
The second maxim is that taxes should be certain. Smith (1776) states that the tax which the 
taxpayer ought to pay must be certain and not arbitrary. This means that the taxpayer must be 
in a position to know full well the amount of tax to pay, at which time, and the manner of 
payment to the Government. This principle will account for 25 per cent of the overall 




“Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most 
likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it” (Smith, 1950, p.347) 
The third maxim identified by Adam Smith is the maxim of convenience. This principle 
attempts to align the timing of tax payment to the most convenient time for the contributor to 
pay it. This would not only ensure that the taxpayer can comply with the tax but it also 
ensures that the tax collector can acquire the tax payment on time. This principle will account 
for 25 per cent of the overall effectiveness of the incentives under examination. 
4.6.4 Economy 
“Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the 
pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the 
public treasury of the state.” (Smith, 1950, p.348) 
Finally, the fourth and final maxim is that tax administration should be economical. 
According to Smith, taxes should be levied with the lowest possible waste, or a process that 
modern economists would call “limiting deadweight loss”. Smith has an extensive description 
of waste, comprising not only administration costs, but also emotional or fiscally draining 
costs to the taxpayer or productivity costs meaning foregone growth opportunity. This 
principle will account for 25 per cent of the overall effectiveness of the incentives under 
examination. 
4.7 Research Methods  




4.7.1 Case Study 
Yin (2009) describes a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context” (p.13). This project gathered data about the 
effectiveness of past and current R&D incentives by conducting a case study of the New 
Zealand situation. Cooper & Schindler (2003) describe a case study as an approach involving 
a “full textual analysis” (p.150). Furthermore, the researcher recognises that the New Zealand 
environment and events transpiring around R&D incentives are distinct and possibly 
exclusive to New Zealand. Thus, a case study of New Zealand‟s R&D incentive situation was 
deemed beneficial. Treating New Zealand as a case study subject acknowledges that the New 
Zealand national R&D incentive experience is unique to what transpires internationally. A 
limitation of this method is then the lack of ability to generalise the findings or replicability 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015, p.69). These issues are mitigated somewhat by the researcher 
undertaking the post-positivism approach that takes in concrete reality but also allows for 
“how” and “why” questions to be asked in an attempt to understand the actual and complex 
“reality” which surrounds the relationships being studied (McKerchar, 2010).   
4.7.2 Documentary Analysis 
In this exploratory study, which cross-compares the past and current New Zealand R&D 
incentives a literature review will be conducted to inject coherence into the body of research 
concerning the incentives (or lack thereof). This process ensued by the creation of a table that 
summarises the main criteria and qualities of each incentive. This table is created from a 
process of documentary analysis. Key information emerging from the previous literature 
review (e.g. eligibility criteria, amount of incentive available, etc.) is used in synthesising the 
summary table.  
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Following this, critical observations and comments from the above two steps and employing 
the understandings in a second table which benchmarks the researcher‟s understanding of the 
individual R&D incentives‟ qualities against Adam Smith‟s Principles of Good Taxation. The 
second table in the discussion section (chapter 4) visually displays where each incentive 
stands individually as well as corporately when cross-comparison takes place among the 
incentives. Data collection is from both primary and secondary sources. The use of 
documentary analysis is used as a primary source. Documentary data used for this research 
included Inland Revenue budget forecasts, Statistics New Zealand surveys, and individual 
bill submissions to the Taxation (Annual Rates for 2015–16, Research and Development, and 
Remedial Matters) Bill. It is important to mention that the researcher acknowledges that these 
different types and sources of data come with differing levels of rigour and reliability and 
should be used accordingly. The researcher also identifies the limitations of using archival 
data. For instance, it was created for a specific audience, at a specific time, and for a specific 
purpose. While this does not altogether deter from using the data it does limit the scope of the 
documents‟ usability. Identifying these conditions means that the analysis is not misleading. 
There is a significant need for critical and interpretative thinking with such evidence (Yin, 
2009). Qualitative document analysis was in place using interpretive analysis starting 
inductively. 
4.7.3 Preliminary Interviews 
Interviewing was a supplementary method. The aims of this study concern research of an 
exploratory nature. However, exploratory research ordinarily means that the investigation is 
in the introductory stage, so there may be complications in finding data. This observation was 
confirmed in a number of instances. Initially the researcher had set out to conduct roughly 
five interviews with R&D tax practitioners nationally in New Zealand. However, due to the 
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R&D Tax Credit repeal there were difficulties finding practitioners as most would have 
moved overseas or no longer were in an R&D role and could provide limited assistance. Two 
semi-structured interviews with R&D practitioners took place, one with a senior level R&D 
tax practitioner working in a Big 4 firm and another with an R&D manager working in the 
chemical engineering sector. The semi-interviews held were not carried out as primary data 
for the project but rather as a preliminary attempt for the researcher to understand the 
situations that transpired regarding R&D Tax Credit‟s removal.  
The interviews conducted in this project have had full ethics clearance by the Human Ethics 
Committee of the University of Canterbury. These are included in Appendix A, alongside the 
Information Sheet and Consent Form in Appendices B, and C, respectively. 
4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
Quantitative research in R&D incentives is somewhat over-practiced in the research world. 
Qualitative R&D incentive research is therefore considered appropriate for use on this 
research as the underlying social and political aspects to R&D meant that there was a need for 
a framework that would understand and unravel complex truths about R&D incentives. This 
chapter described my research development, design and the overall approach this study uses 
to address the research questions. The data analysis will be conducted through the lens of a 





CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the documentary analysis findings of this research. The main purpose of 
the documentary analysis was to review New Zealand‟s past and current R&D incentives and 
make tentative conclusions as to which incentive(s) among these is/are likely to be the most 
effective for use in New Zealand. For simplification purposes and due to scope limitations, 
this thesis assumed that increased R&D spending is positive and that the Government should 
support businesses to increase their R&D spending by providing incentives that help 
businesses mitigate the risks of conducting R&D. The resultant effect from embracing the 
above-mentioned assumptions led the researcher on a narrower research endeavour.  
This project aimed to draw tentative conclusions as to which R&D incentive(s) among New 
Zealand‟s past and current R&D incentive systems is/are likely to be the most effective in 
terms of being the most equitable, convenient, certain, and economical - that is, the R&D 
incentive(s) most reflective of Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation (Smith, 
1950). Overall, this project tentatively explored which R&D incentive(s) should the New 
Zealand Government provide. 
To gain some context for assessing which R&D incentive may be the most effective among 
the past and current R&D incentives in New Zealand, an initial understanding of the main 
elements concerning each individual R&D option was required. The researcher tabulated an 
information synthesis summary under section 5.3 containing a summarised visual depiction 
of the three incentives in a single snapshot. The aim of this summary was to provide an 
understanding regarding the basic elements concerning each R&D incentive. Table 5.1 
provides a layout that facilitates for cross-comparison of the incentives by the reader. A pre-
discussion will occur before the appearance of the table, which elaborates the elements 
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pertaining to each R&D incentive by discussing further information involving the current and 
past R&D incentives. This discussion will explore aspects leading to the creation of each 
incentive. 
Section 5.2 of the chapter and its subsections aim to establish a clearer understanding of each 
incentive both individually as a standalone incentive and corporately by visually pinning the 
incentives side by side, allowing the reader to identify similarities and difference at first 
glance. This step is to familiarise the reader with the context and technical aspects 
surrounding each incentive. This allows for exploration of each incentive‟s merits and 
shortfalls independently. This answers the first question that this thesis examines, being:  
RQ1: Why did each incentive come into being? (Policy intentions) 
As mentioned earlier (Chapter 1 to Chapter 4), the main goal of this research is to evaluate 
which New Zealand R&D incentive is likely the most effective in terms of four main 
overarching principles. This involves conducting an exploratory approach that uses Adam 
Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation as the standard for comparison across the three 
incentives at hand. This step involves a qualitative documentary analysis, conducting a case 
study of the New Zealand situation R&D situation where each R&D incentive is evaluated 
under the four canons of good taxation as put forth by Adam Smith. This step answers the 
second question put forth in this thesis, being:  
RQ2: How does each incentive fare when benchmarked against 
Adam Smith’s Principles of Good Taxation? 
The research answers this question by a combination of ways including employing the 
understandings gained of the R&D incentives from the first table (Table 5.1) and taking into 
consideration the findings from the documentary analysis performed pertaining to each 
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incentive. A second table is created below (Table 5.2) which benchmarks the findings against 
Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation. The second table visually depicts where 
each incentive stands individually as well as when cross-comparison takes place among the 
incentives.  
In order to make some tentative conclusions as to which R&D incentive(s) is/are likely the 
most effective in terms of Adam Smith‟s four main overarching taxation principles, the 
researcher uses a rudimentary scaling system that allocates one of the three symbols (+ = 
Positive, ± = No Effect, and − = Negative) to each statement which parallels the 
corresponding evaluative principle. See the illustrative application below in Example 1: 
Example 1 
If the findings for ‘Incentive A’ state that its administrative procedures are 
particularly onerous - An economy issue under Adam Smith’s Principles of Good 
Taxation, at that point in Table 5.2 the finding indicating the nature of the 
onerous administrative procedures written for ‘Incentive A’ that corresponds with 
the economy principle is allocated a symbol of ‘–’ indicating this is a Negative. 
An evaluation matrix summary (Table 5.3) aggregates all the symbols for each incentive with 
the respective evaluative proposed principles in place. The weights allocated to each principle 
are equal at 25 per cent each totalling 100 per cent overall as there is no explicit mention by 
Adam Smith as to principles that are higher in importance. The R&D incentive which is the 
closest in meeting the standards expressed by Adam Smith‟s four principles will be, for the 
purposes of this research, considered the one likely to be most effective for use. Therefore, 
after the above takes place, the researcher then draws tentative conclusions under section 5.5 
as to the third question put forth in this thesis being:  
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RQ3: Which incentive(s) is/are likely most effective (using Adam Smith’s 
Principles as the evaluative framework)? 
The data used to conduct the above comparison consisted of varied official documents 
pertaining to each incentive. In the case of the R&D Cash Out of losses incentive, 
submissions from nation-wide submitters to the tax bill concerning this incentive (Annual 
Rates for 2015-2016, Research and Development, and Remedial Matters Bill) were used. 
These submissions were considered for documentary analysis as the submissions contain in-
depth scrutiny of practical as well as technical implications of legislating the R&D Cash Out 
of losses incentive. It is acknowledged that submissions to the bill from different bodies and 
businesses came with different levels of rigour and even perhaps brought forth certain biases 
and agency issues, hence, Agency Theory as well as Institutional Theory was utilised to 
decode the underlying meanings behind the submissions.  
To the researcher‟s knowledge, there is no existing academic study on New Zealand R&D 
Grants specifically. This provides a contribution opportunity as this research could pave the 
way for such research to commence. The body of documents used to benchmark this 
incentive against Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles were information derived from the 
Callaghan Innovation (CI) website.
5
 The CI website currently has the widest amount of 
guidelines and other criteria on the subject of R&D Grants. The information available on the 
website, which discusses each grant, was benchmarked in a way comparable to the other two 
incentives. For example, a consideration in regard to R&D Grants eligibility criteria being 
equitable has occurred in a way comparable to the R&D Cash Out of losses eligibility criteria 
and the R&D Tax Credit‟s. 
                                                          
5
 See http://www.callaghaninnovation.govt.nz/ 
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In the case of the R&D Tax Credit, in an effort to utilise previous research on the incentive 
and to facilitate integration of prior work alongside this research, interviewee comments from 
nine interviews conducted by Robinson (2009) were used – this way, an integration of 
previous research assisted the findings of this research. Regulatory Impact Statements from 
the repeal of the credit have also been used as these illustrate the concerns that had surfaced 
leading to the removal of the credit. These concerns were handled similarly, to how the R&D 
Cash Out of losses submission issues have been used.  
5.2 R&D Incentives Information Synthesis Summary 
In this research, to gain some context, the aim is to initially compare and contrast each of the 
past & Current R&D Incentives in a New Zealand context. This section has aimed to capture 
crucial information surrounding the situations that transpired to create each of the incentives 
at different points in time. The very design of the incentives was also briefly discussed and 
the policy rationales briefly examined in order to attempt to understand the New Zealand 
Government‟s thought process behind the R&D incentives.  
In the next section, this research will tentatively assess, in a qualitative capacity, which R&D 
incentive is likely the most effective in New Zealand. This was attempted by examining 
submissions to the recent R&D bill and giving somewhat of a rudimentary scale to the issues 
in a relative ranking discussed under section 5.1 above. It is important to note that the 
researcher‟s stance in this thesis is that the Government should be supporting R&D and that 
increasing R&D is considered positive. 
Therefore, section 5.2 of the chapter aims to establish a clearer understanding of each 
incentive both individually as standalone R&D incentives and also corporately by visually 
pinning the incentives side by side, allowing the reader to identify similarities and differences 
at first glance.  This step is to familiarise the reader with the context and technical aspects of 
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each incentive allowing for exploration of each incentive‟s merits and shortfalls 
independently. This answers the first question that the thesis examines, RQ1: “Why did each 
incentive come into being? (Policy intentions)” 
An R&D incentive information synthesis summary table is included under section 5.3 with 
the researcher‟s elaborations detailed beforehand. Sections 5.2.1 – 5.2.6 will discuss the 
incentives in the order in which they have been in use in New Zealand. Matters such as target 
claimants, policy rationales, eligibility and other such criteria are discussed. Starting with 
R&D Tax Credit (Sections 5.2.1-5.2.2) which was introduced with effect during the 2008-
2009 income year, followed by the R&D Grants (Sections 5.2.3-5.2.4) – with Callaghan 
Innovation Act enacted in 2012 to administer the new R&D Grants established (Callaghan 
Innovation Act, 2012). The Grants are currently in use. Lastly, sections 5.2.5-5.2.6 will 
discuss the most recent R&D incentive, the R&D Cash Out incentive, which was enacted in 
the Taxation (Annual Rates for 2015-2016, Research and Development, and Remedial 
Matters) Act 2016 and is on-going at this stage. 
5.2.1 R&D Tax Credit  
5.2.1.1 General Overview 
The R&D Tax Credit allowed firms to have a deduction for R&D expenditure from their 
corporate tax liabilities. A comprehensive study by Köhler et. al (2012), which recounts many 
R&D incentive studies, describes the impact and effectiveness of several different incentives 
for R&D. The study finds that with respect to design features of R&D tax incentives, 
“volume-based incentives and tax credits tend to produce higher additionality, as holds for 
more generous schemes” (Köhler et. al, 2012, p.3).  
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The study also recounts a recent longitudinal study in the Netherlands on the welfare effects 
of a volume-based R&D Tax Credit programme. The results of which suggests that: input 
additionality weakens over time, and that increased government spending on R&D causes an 
equivalent fall in private sector R&D spending. This can only be avoided for small firms 
while for large firms the scheme turned out to be ineffective.  
This finding would suggest differentiating R&D tax incentives by firm size or the volume of 
R&D expenditure, for example, through introducing caps or applying different rates for small 
and larger firms. In addition, a tax incentive could be lowered for firms that have used the 
credit for some time (Köhler et. al, 2012, p.4); this measure could alleviate the effect of the 
crowding out of private R&D spending. The study summarises that the scope of a fiscal 
incentive really lies in its implementation and hence perhaps the same lies for a New Zealand 
R&D Tax Credit. 
In conclusion, while there are some variations, the majority of research seems to pinpoint 
that, if implemented in the appropriate manner R&D Tax Credits are a highly effective R&D 
incentive. Research shows that while somewhat difficult to forecast for, R&D Tax Credits 
offer no discrimination to all national firms alike, offering a high degree of involvement from 
firms in each particular country. In terms of this project, which particularly reviews the level 
of equity among three other principles (as in section 5.5) of the incentives, the finding that 
most previous studies conclude in terms of the R&D Tax Credits offering no discrimination is 
indicative that the R&D Tax Credits are equitable.  
5.2.1.2 Policy Rationale 
The decision to introduce the past New Zealand R&D Tax Credit incentive was led by a 
discussion document conducting a New Zealand based business tax review released in July 
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2006 (Cullen & Dunne, 2006). The discussion document had involved several months‟ work 
in considering possibilities which could reform the New Zealand tax system.  
Targeted tax credits were among the possible options suggested in this document for the 
reason that, in relation to R&D, this would parallel the level of New Zealand‟s R&D 
spending with its OECD co-members (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, Para 310, p.15). Therefore, 
there was acknowledgement that New Zealand‟s R&D spending was noticeably substandard 
when compared with other members of the OECD. Thus the main publicly recognized 
justification for the summoning of the tax concessions was to correct the market failure of 
underinvestment in R&D by New Zealand firms.  
The main theoretical framework used in this thesis, political institutionalism, assists in 
examining the introduction of the R&D Tax Credit and how this decision may be influenced 
by political and social institutions in New Zealand.  In adopting the above-mentioned 
framework, there is a wish to „clarify‟ the situation in New Zealand to highlight the 
motivations of institutional variables in generating the R&D Tax Credit incentive policy. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, institutional theory is concerned with political and social institutions 
which contribute greatly to shaping political “actors” in terms of the way these political 
actors then define their interest and exert their influence on other groups (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p.2). This theoretical framework can help unravel the underlying factors that 
form a motivation for a Government to rationalise a policy choice such as the R&D Tax 
Credit.  
For the purposes of this research, the New Zealand Government can be thought of as a 
political institution and taxpayers as a social institution. The Government body which had 
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welcomed the enactment of the R&D Tax Credit was the Labour Party.
 6
 As New Zealand 
General Elections were underway in 2008, the interplay between the above-mentioned 
institutions could be that the Labour-led Government authorised the enactment of the R&D 
Tax Credit, which was accessible across many New Zealand SME firms, in order to seem as a 
government that supports business. The main theoretical framework is further supplemented 
in this research by agency theory, which would suggest that the Labour Party serve citizens to 
their own best interests. The Labour Party would wish to appear as an entity supporting 
business, as this may consequently persuade voters that benefit from the tax concession to 
cast their votes in favour of the Labour Party for the 2008 General Election.  
Further justification for the creation of the concessions is to reduce the level of complicated 
administrative procedures involved with such measures as delivering this R&D Tax Credit 
assistance through the tax system is seen as the most efficient mechanism for the Government 
to provide support (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, Para. 3.8, p.15). This justification was inferring 
that discretionary support for R&D was already in place via R&D grant programmes.  
The R&D Tax Credit applied from the 2008/09 income year and was designed to encourage 
private sector business R&D spending in New Zealand. The incentive was created to make 
the activity more appealing by providing subsidy in the form of tax credits to firms who 
undertake eligible R&D activities. This incentive is created to generate additional R&D 
hence increasing productivity in the economy; this leads to creating more innovative 
workplaces and a highly skilled workforce.  
Thus the policy rationale behind the creation of the past R&D Tax Credit can be summarised 
in the following (note that these may inter-relate): 
                                                          
6
 The Labour Party was voted in the 48
th
 Term in the 2005 General Elections. The National Party was voted in 
the 49
th





 To level New Zealand‟s R&D spending with its fellow OECD members 
 To correct underinvestment in R&D by generating additional R&D 
 To encourage private sector investment in R&D  
 To boost productivity/innovation and therefore international competitiveness 
 To provide a measure which does not involve onerous bureaucratic procedures 
5.2.1.3 Targeted Claimant 
The targeted businesses include those which undertake a minimum of $20,000 of eligible 
R&D expenditure (explained below) per year that the claim is made. Perhaps the reason 
behind the minimum threshold amount is established to bring to a minimum compliance and 
administrative costs which would coincide with the economy principle which dictates that 
Government incentives should be levied with the smallest possible waste including in this 
case, administration and compliance costs to the taxpayer and the state. 
Virtually all businesses are eligible to claim the R&D Tax Credit regardless of their legal 
structure if the R&D is performed mainly in New Zealand as additional investment in R&D 
by New Zealand companies has broader benefits for the New Zealand economy (Inland 
Revenue, 2007). Access to the tax concessions by public sector entities was disallowed 
possibly as such entities could access more effective instruments for increasing their R&D 
spending including internal funding, special government grants and investor funding. This 
treatment coincides with the equity principle on the level that there was an attempt to make 
the R&D incentive options impartial and applicable to smaller R&D firms with less 
significant R&D projects that may have not been eligible for a R&D grant.   
The excluded entities include Crown Research Institutes, tertiary institutions and District 
Health Boards. Access to the R&D tax concession was extended to entities controlled by the 
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excluded entities. This is most likely to avoid the main excluded entities entering into false 
restructuring and tax planning arrangements to be artificially eligible for the tax concessions, 
which is perhaps a measure to uphold the integrity (by minimising anticipated fraud) as well 
as equity of the tax concessions as per the explanation above.   
Furthermore, the claimant must also “control” the R&D and bear the financial risk pertaining 
to the R&D undertaken. This is to ensure that the tax concession goes towards the party 
which undertakes the R&D investment and to thwart numerous claims for the same 
expenditure (Inland Revenue, 2007, p.6). Again, this is a combination of equity & integrity 
upholding measures as they are in place to ensure a fair treatment and limit the opportunity to 
commit fraud. 
5.2.1.4 Rate of R&D Allowance, Eligible Expenditure, and Administrative Procedure 
The R&D Tax Credit incentive is essentially an entitlement regime, meaning that had the 
claimant met the eligibility criteria, they can consequently access the Tax Credit – rather 
than, say discretionary government assistance such as an R&D grant which is more focused 
on testing the merit of the project being done and deciding if it is a profitable project. The tax 
system provided the credit at the rate of 15 per cent of eligible R&D expenditure in a year. 
The claimant must file a supporting document in addition to requesting the R&D tax 
concession in the annual income tax return filed for the company, counterweighing the tax 
liability of the claimant.  
Excess tax credits result in a refund, however, if a business had encountered a tax loss for the 
year (or only had tax-exempt income), the business may receive the credits they are due in 
cash. The credit will reduce residual income tax, which will reduce provisional tax liability, 
allowing businesses that pay provisional tax to receive the benefit of the credit closer to the 
time they incur R&D expenditure. This technical treatment would coincide with the 
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upholding of the convenience principle of Good Taxation. This is as the above-mentioned 
technical treatment brought by the implementation of the Tax Credit would allow taxpayers a 
timing advantage and therefore have positive convenience implications.  
Section LH 7 of the ITA 2007 defined eligible R&D activities. The section namely advised 
that the R&D activities must be systematic, investigative and experimental undertakings that 
either pursue the advancement of science or technology by the resolution of scientific or 
technological uncertainty, or that comprise a considerable component of innovation.  
Eligible expenditure is explicitly mentioned includes (Inland Revenue, 2007): “employee 
salaries and training, depreciation of tangible assets used primarily in conducting R&D, 
overhead costs, consumables, and payments to entities conducting R&D on behalf of the 
claimant” (Inland Revenue, 2007, p.22-23). Likewise, ineligible expenditure is explicitly 
mentioned and includes: “Interest, the loss on sale or write-off of depreciable property, the 
cost of acquiring core technology (technology used as a basis for further R&D), expenditure 
funded from a government grant or the required co-funding, expenditure on intangible assets 
and professional fees in determining eligibility” (Inland Revenue, 2007, p.22). Moreover, 
undertakings which support Systematic, Investigative and Experimental Activities (S.I.E.), 
but that are not S.I.E.in themselves, are eligible if they are entirely or mostly for the purpose 
of the S.I.E. activities and are necessary for, and vital to, them. 
Therefore, for a business that claims the R&D Tax Credit, the anticipated impact is that the 
business can expect their marginal costs of R&D spending to reduce and therefore may be 
able perform further R&D as the financial risk of performing R&D reduces through use of 
the R&D Tax Credit incentive. Furthermore, there are likely to be spillover benefits to New 
Zealand when companies invest in R&D. 
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5.2.2 Adam Smith Principles Evaluation – Past R&D Tax Credit  
5.2.2.1 Equity 
As mentioned previously, Crown Research Institutes, tertiary institutions and District Health 
Boards, their associates and entities controlled by them were ineligible for the credit. These 
entities were excluded because the credits were intended to encourage private sector 
investment in R&D, and there are more effective mechanisms for increasing the amount of 
R&D carried out by these institutions. Therefore, in terms of business eligibility, the 
researcher believes that there are mechanisms put in place, which deal with the fair 
distribution of tax benefits in the case of the R&D Tax Credit. This is as theoretically with the 
creation of the R&D Tax Credit, the distribution of tax benefits is broadly across the majority 
of firms in New Zealand, and that more importantly; firms at the same economic position can 
have access to the same level of benefit. Thus, these implications allude to the upholding of 
the equity principle in terms of the drafting of the R&D Tax Credit. 
In summary, R&D Tax Credits in theory offered no discrimination to all national firms alike. 
As the past R&D Tax Credit came into being a time when general discretionary R&D Grants 
were in place, the emphasis behind the creation of the R&D Tax Credits was to bring about 
an option for taxpayers performing R&D that applies a broad-brush approach that does not 
favour one company over another. This would in turn increase the level of equity that 
transpired among the R&D incentives on offer for taxpayers at the time being. The researcher 
concludes that according to the above elements in terms of eligibility to the Tax Credit, and 
the spirit and meaning of equity according to Adam Smith the standard of equity is likely met 
with regard to the R&D Tax Credit. 
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5.2.2.2 Certainty  
As eligibility to the R&D Tax Credit is limited by a minimum threshold amount of $20,000 
of eligible R&D expenditure per year that the claim is made, this makes the Credit a volume-
based (total amount of R&D) as opposed to an incrementally based (additional R&D done 
above a base-year level) incentive. The justification for this according to a Tax Reform 
Package Government release (The Beehive, 2007) is that the volume method is easier to 
grasp and put into application (The Beehive, 2007, p.6). The construction of this measure 
aligns with the principle of certainty. That is, the taxpayer or business would then have to 
approach a simpler method to working out their eligibility. This will endow firms with more 
certainty about the possible benefit of the R&D Tax Credit when forecasting their R&D 
investment over the longer term.  
Moreover, in the stages of planning the R&D Tax Credit, a discussion document was released 
(Cullen & Dunne, 2006) which suggests an expert body to review and determine eligible 
expenditure. Had this approach proceeded, it would mean that a firm could look to seek the 
pre-approval from the expert body to increase certainty that the expenditure was eligible. In a 
special report released to potential claimants to aid in understanding of the R&D Tax Credit, 
the claimant was advised that they could apply to the Commissioner to determine whether an 
activity is R&D, eligibility for the credit and whether certain expenditure is eligible for the 
Credit (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, p.4). This tool, which is available for taxpayers, can also 
increase their certainty in terms of eligibility to the Tax Credit. 
Moreover, the discussion document mentioned above (Cullen & Dunne, 2006) also stated that 
the definition of “eligible expenditure” had to be clear and had to deliver an objective 
definition of the relevant expenditure (Cullen & Dunne, 2006, Para 3.12, p.15). As mentioned 
in the historical overview earlier in this thesis (section 3.3), the findings for research 
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undertaken to uncover insights on good policy design (Sawyer, 2005) included the use of the 
OECD‟s Frascati definition for R&D. The R&D Tax Credit utilised a definition describing 
R&D activities as “systematic, investigative and experimental activities” (Section LH 7 (2) 
ITA 2007). This definition is similar to the definition recommended by the OECD in that it 
alludes to activities which acquire new knowledge, creating new or improved products or 
similar. As the definition selected reflects one confirmed as effective by an established line of 
academic research, the researcher deems that the decision to choose a clearer definition is 
likely key for the workability of a Tax Credit incentive and one that can consequently 
increase certainty for a taxpayer undertaking R&D.  
5.2.2.3 Convenience 
As mentioned previously, the tax system administered process of obtaining the past R&D Tax 
Credit, meant that a claimant was to request the R&D Tax Credit in the annual income tax 
return filed for the company, offsetting the tax liability of the claimant. The credit would 
reduce residual income tax, reducing provisional tax liability, and allowing firms that pay 
provisional tax to receive the benefit of the credit closer to the time they incur R&D 
expenditure. This technical treatment would coincide with the upholding of convenience. The 
researcher considers that the technical treatment brought by the implementation of the Tax 
Credit would allow taxpayers a timing advantage and therefore likely have positive 
convenience implications.  
5.2.2.4 Economy 
There are two levels in which the economy principle is to be considered; the state level and 
the taxpayer level. Again, perhaps the reason behind the minimum threshold amount is 
established to bring to a minimum compliance and administrative costs which would coincide 
with the economy in operation principle which dictates that Government incentives should be 
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levied with the smallest possible waste. However, due to the R&D Tax Credit being available 
to be claimed by any R&D practicing firm which is eligible for the Credit, this would mean 
that it is not possible to budget reliably for such support as this will depend to a greater extent 
on the comprehensive design and scope of eligible expenditure. This uncertainty has caused 
financial sustainability issues for the state and formed one of the reasons to repeal the Credit. 
In terms of the taxpayer plane, practitioners described the administrative and compliance 
requirements as “onerous” (Robinson, 2009, p.16). In particular, the Inland Revenue released 
a Research and Development Tax Information Bulletin (2008) which required a “detailed 
supporting statement”. Robinson‟s findings (Robinson, 2009) state that the biggest 
undertaking between the enactment of the Tax Credit and its repeal was businesses setting up 
or upgrading systems to be able to capture their expenditure and be eligible for the Credit. 
While the number of interviews conducted limited Robinson‟s findings, the nine practitioners 
interviewed collectively have advised close to 100 firms in total. For the purposes of this 
research, the opinions held by the practitioners while limited by personal biases are 
considered to represent the context that transpired during the time. 
This occurrence of upgrading and creating systems took place perhaps due to SMEs in New 
Zealand previously having no reason for capturing their R&D spending in detail, however, 
due to the enactment of the R&D Tax Credit, there was motivation for this action to occur. 
Hence, the cost involved in the process of setting up systems (albeit sunk costs) was a large 
cost for many taxpayers.  
Onerous costs regarding the R&D Tax Credit included compliance and administration costs, 
sustainability issues, and budgeting constraints. While taxpayers were burdened with such 
onerous costs, the extent of these costs being directly attributable to the enactment of the 
R&D Tax Credit is debatable. As previously mentioned under this section, a justification for 
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the high compliance costs in the first year of the R&D Tax Credit is likely due to upgrading 
and creating of systems for R&D spending record keeping (Robinson, 2009, p.25). Hence, the 
cost involved in the process of setting up systems was a large cost for many taxpayers during 
this time and would have needed to take place regardless of the type of R&D incentive at 
hand. Moreover, due to the limited amount of time that this R&D incentive was utilised for, 
the economic implications cannot be sufficiently studied. For these reasons, the researcher 
considers the economy in operation principle to be neither upheld nor abandoned within the 
past R&D Tax Credit which results in a No-Effect outcome (Neither negative nor positive).  
5.2.3 R&D Grants  
5.2.3.1 General Overview 
R&D Grants are not looked on favourably by practitioners as they are seen as a minimum 
level of government investment (Robinson, 2009, p.37) due to the Grants being given to 
“back winners” by the Government selecting projects which have a high probability of 
producing profit. According to Robinson (2009), this seems to be an “exclusive” system of 
funding (Robinson, 2009, p.38). In addition, European-based studies have unveiled that 
Grants are not groundbreaking in effect because of their “targeted nature” (Sawyer, 2005, 
p.135).  
One recent study (Jaffe & Le, 2015) investigates the impact on innovation output of 
government assistance in terms of R&D Grants within a New Zealand context. The authors 
found that receiving an R&D grant considerably increases the likelihood that a firm in the 
manufacturing and service sectors applies for a patent throughout 2005–2009, but finds no 
positive impact on the possibility of applying for a trademark. This study is limited to firms 
that participated in the Business Operation Survey. The study also finds that receiving a grant 
nearly doubles the probability that a firm introduces new goods and services to the market. 
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However, its effects on process innovation and any product innovation are comparatively 
much weaker. This study also finds that there is little evidence that effect of grant receipt has 
differences between small to medium firms.  
These findings contrast with a previous study (Ministry of Economic Development, 2011) 
which examined whether the R&D grant programme increased receiving firms‟ sales, 
employment and productivity. The MoED study found an emergence of impact for Grants 
similar to the Getting Started Grants that are capability-building, but no evidence of impact 
for R&D Project Grants; and the positive impact was limited to small firms without any 
evidence of impact for larger firms. The Jaffe & Le (2015, p.25-26) study proposes a few 
suggestions as to why the difference in conclusions occurred. A summary of these 
suggestions is below: 
1. The small sample size meant that the effect of the Project Grants on innovation could 
not be detected as innovation measures improved economic performance on average.  
2. The lag between innovation and improved performance is so long that this effect 
cannot be detected in the authors‟ study. The Ministry of Economic Development 
study, on the other hand, monitors performance effects up to four years after firms 
first receive assistance. 
3. Market failure causing firms to under-invest in R&D due to risk of imitations. 
Imitations may follow innovation in a discouraging way where the returns to original 
innovators are not significantly higher than to imitators.  
4. The innovation measures the authors have used are poor proxies for real innovation. 
This again may mean that the link cannot be detected.  
5. Innovation is not a sufficiently vital cause of economic performance to make an 
increase in innovation due to a Project Grants appear in economic performance 
relative to that of firms that had not received a grant. 
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6. Project Grants have no effect on true innovation, but employees of firms that have 
received Grants consciously or unconsciously prompt an internal belief that they are 
innovating.  
Critically speaking, perhaps the sum total of the findings from previous academic research 
seem to suggest that R&D Grants are somewhat passive in nature as they do not necessarily 
gear more firms to increase their R&D spending. They rather work as a reward. 
5.2.3.2 Policy Rationale 
The National Party brought forth the Callaghan Innovation-administered R&D Grants which 
offer discretionary governmental assistance, who at the same time chose to repeal the R&D 
Tax Credits. As mentioned previously practitioners see R&D Grants as a minimal level of 
government investment due to their selectivity in choosing “winners” by distributing the 
largest amount of R&D support to companies that already perform well. Political 
institutionalism can guide in examining the Government‟s motivation in introducing the new 
R&D Grants and driving the removal of R&D Tax Credits, as R&D in itself is largely 
political. The theoretical framework chosen for the research could explain the motives for the 
introduction of the R&D Grants and the removal of the R&D Tax Credit despite its promise 
due to a change of government.  
Placing the New Zealand Government as the central and most powerful institution, perhaps it 
is in the Government‟s best interests to appear as a financially responsible body by first, 
removing the R&D Tax Credit based on high fiscal running cost. Secondly, by lifting the 
R&D outputs through allocating most of the funds available for R&D support to high 
achieving companies and therefore placing “safe bets”. As mentioned in Chapter 4 above, 
agency theory describes a relationship in which the principal delegates work to an agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In the case of the R&D Callaghan Grants, the Government (the principal) 
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delegates work to be administered by Callaghan (the agent), who then performs that work to 
their best interest. Agency theory would suggest that Callaghan Innovation, by selecting the 
winners in the economy, essentially bring further financial gains, which would in turn make 
Callaghan appear as performing well, gain more support from the Government, and hence 
more power.  
This paradigm is exemplified by research undertaken by political institutionalism scholar 
Steinmo (Steinmo, 1993, p.10) who relays that Government and the structure of political 
institutions are key influences in taxation policy change. This perhaps brings forth that such 
policy decisions reflect political agendas and notwithstanding economic reasoning, hence, the 
removal of the R&D Tax Credit despite its promise for bringing higher output additionality 
established by economic research (Sawyer, 2005, Köhler et. al., 2012). 
Unlike the R&D Tax Credit which is accessible to virtually any company which meets the 
eligibility criteria, the R&D Grants place more emphasis on testing the merit of the project 
being done and deciding if it is a profitable project. Section 13 of the Callaghan Innovation 
Act 2012 states that Callaghan Innovation‟s chief objective is to fund science and 
technology-based innovation and its commercialisation by entities, mainly in the 
manufacturing sector and services sector, this is to develop their growth and competitiveness.  
There are several types of R&D grants available including Growth Grants, Project Grants, 
Getting Started Grants, and R&D Career Grants, which branch out into Student Grants. New 
Zealand‟s current performance in relation to R&D spending as a percentage of GDP ranks 
29
th
 out of 35 OECD countries. The Government‟s rationale to call upon the Callaghan 
Innovation administered R&D Grants was the challenge to grow private sector investment in 
R&D. Growing private sector investment in R&D remains to be an area where New Zealand 
continues to lag behind as evident by the ranking above.  
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5.2.3.3 Targeted Claimant 
This R&D incentive runs to an opposite direction to the demographic that the R&D Cash Out 
(discussed in section 5.2.3 below) is targeting. The objective of this R&D incentive is to fund 
companies that already do well in terms of innovative success and R&D spending.  
For any business to elect for an R&D Grant, the business as a starting point must meet the 
Business Eligibility criteria and be among the entity types that are eligible for the R&D 
Grant, therefore the business must be one of the following:  
 Registered under the Companies Act or the Limited Partnerships Act, 
 A Māori incorporation or trust established under the Te Ture Whenua  Māori Act, 
 A trust set up to manage assets as part of a Treaty of Waitangi settlement, 
 A Māori statutory body; OR, 
 A business controlled by one or more of these entities. 
In addition, other general criteria must be met as per below:  
 A business must meet financial and due diligence requirements. 
 The claim must be for R&D performed in NZ (unless pre-approved). 
 The claimant must have an active R&D programme. 
 The claimant must not bring the reputation of CI or the R&D Grants programme into 
disrepute. 
 The claimant must conduct R&D activities as defined in NZ IAS 38. 
The above criteria depict a niche demographic that many companies will not be eligible 
under. The narrow spectrum of which companies can elect for support from this incentive is 
designed intentionally as to limit selection to highly performing entities that tend to be 
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incorporated companies rather than, say, small manufacturing firms which may miss out on 
the R&D Grants. 
The first three criteria above do represent standard eligibility requirements however; the final 
two criteria above including the reputation clause and the R&D accounting definition are 
specific to the Callaghan Administered R&D Grants. Callaghan Innovation have included the 
reputation clause as of recently after Callaghan Innovation had public tensions with Trends 
Publishing and Gameloft (mentioned above in section 3.1). The reputation clause exists to 
preserve the reputation of Callaghan Innovation and the R&D Grants, indicating that to be 
eligible a business must not bring either of the two into disrepute.   
5.2.3.4 Rate of R&D Allowance, Eligible Expenditure, and Administrative Procedure 
The rate of R&D Grant varies by Grant type, as per below: 
 Growth Grant: 20 per cent of eligible R&D expenditure up to $5M p/a ($25M over 5 
years).  
 Getting Started Grant: 40 per cent of eligible R&D expenditure up to $5,000.  
 Project Grant: 40 per cent of eligible R&D project costs. 
 Career Grant: depending on career-grant type. Range $6,400 – $75,000. 
From the above list, it can be observed that the Growth Grant yields the highest amount of 
funding available for an eligible company. For a company to elect for the Growth Grant it 
must spend at least $300,000 in the year and have 1.5 per cent of revenue on R&D Intensity 
(RDI) in each of the last 2 years to the year being claimed or planned to meet this target in the 
following year. This extra criterion automatically distances any company that may not be able 
to spend the $300,000 due to a lack of internal funds and be ineligible for the Growth Grants. 
This is perhaps another indication that the R&D Grants (particularly the more generous 
grants) are really fashioned to accommodate companies that have a higher level of capital and 
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with robust R&D programmes already in place. The Ministry of Business Innovation & 
Employment released a report (2014) which depicted that New Zealand‟s Small and Small-
Medium Enterprises (SME), which include anywhere from zero to 49 employees total up to 
roughly 460,000 firms while medium and large firms total up to roughly 4,750 firms. Given 
that Callaghan Innovation allocate Growth R&D Grants to between 15-20 firms a year, this 
indicates a limited number of successful applicants and perhaps that the allocation is arguably 
weighted towards medium and large firms which have the internal capital and investor power 
to be able to meet the RDI criteria. 
Therefore, the design of the R&D Grants may mean that many New Zealand firms in the 
Small-Medium spectrum to miss out on the more generous grants, and given that SMEs make 
up most of New Zealand‟s firms (MBIE, 2014), this would indicate that only a select few 
firms would be able to unlock the more generous R&D grant amounts.    
In terms of ineligible expenditure, the Ministerial Direction Guidelines provide a thorough 
list of general and specific exclusions including items such as “Research in the social 
sciences, arts or humanities”. As for eligible criteria, this includes any R&D expenditure as 
defined under IAS 38 „Development Phase‟ Para 57 (clarified under NZ FRS13).  
The administrative procedures involve making initial contact with CI to establish eligibility. 
This is perhaps as the Callaghan Innovation website has an overwhelming body of 
information to filter through. Therefore, the claimant personally investigating information on 
specific types of grants as criteria differs per grant type may be a tedious and time-consuming 




Then the claimant is advised to read the Grant funding agreement. After these two initial 
steps take place, the claimant is to file an application for a Grant providing audited financial 
statements and file an annual progress report or final proposal to CI. 
5.2.4 Adam Smith Principles Evaluation – Current R&D Grants   
5.2.4.1 Equity 
Unlike the R&D Tax Credit business eligibility criteria, which specify that any company 
performing eligible R&D activities except for a select few types of entities can claim the tax 
concession, the business eligibility criteria for an R&D Grant depict a niche demographic that 
many companies will not be eligible under. While there are four main types of R&D Grants 
under the new Callaghan Innovation-administered R&D Grant regime, the grant offering the 
highest level of R&D support is the R&D Growth Grant offering up to $5 million dollars 
funding per annum.   
Eligibility to the Growth Grant is limited to companies that have spent at least $300,000 per 
annum and 1.5 per cent of revenue on eligible R&D (RDI) in each of the two years prior to 
applying for the R&D Growth Grant. As the companies would initially have to allocate a 
significant amount of capital on R&D expenditure per year to be eligible for this type of 
grant, this would automatically alienate the likes of start-up companies, small, and small-
medium R&D firm which make up the vast majority of the businesses in New Zealand from 
accessing particularly more generous grants. 
The impact of the R&D Grants is larger than, say, receiving an R&D Tax Credit; this is as the 
amount of R&D assistance given from an R&D Grant tends to be much more generous. In 
this way, while the R&D Tax Credit is available to many companies offering a smaller 
rebate, a R&D Grant would be available to a select few companies and offer a larger rebate. 
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Political institutionalism would suggest that the somewhat narrow spectrum of which 
companies could elect for support from this incentive and, in particular, the R&D Growth 
Grant, is designed intentionally as to limit selection to highly performing entities. This action 
brings about themes of agency implications and may be motivated by the Government (which 
is assumed under agency theory to represent its citizens to its own best interest) desiring to 
appear as fiscally responsible and performing well to gain more support by citizens and hence 
more power. 
The principle of equity under Adam Smith‟s evaluative framework centres on the fair 
distribution of tax burdens, and that those who have the greater ability to pay should pay 
more tax – an ideal that the New Zealand tax system upholds in terms of uptaking progressive 
tax rates. The claimant successful in receiving the Growth Grants in specific would gain a 
substantial boost towards their R&D. This could mean that there is more flexibility for that 
company to select projects which are not nearing the commercialisation stage and take on 
more risky R&D projects as the increase in funding effectively decreases the risk of 
conducting that project. 
If one considers the dynamics of how the R&D Grants are distributed with the more generous 
grants rewarded to the “winners” in the economy, while the less substantial grants going 
towards smaller, less successful firms, this challenges the concept of equity. Effectively, 
larger firms receiving substantial tax benefits (and therefore paying less tax) from the R&D 
Grant regime are challenging the idea of equity, which states that taxpayers with higher 
incomes should pay a higher level of tax. As the opposite would occur in the case of R&D 
Grants, the treatment of the benefit received is rather regressive.  
Therefore, due to vertical equity issues as mentioned above, the researcher believes that there 
are inadequacies that cause an unfair distribution of tax benefits in the case of the R&D 
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Grants. This is as theoretically with the creation of the R&D Tax Credit, the distribution of 
governmental benefits is ring-fenced to a select few firms in New Zealand. Thus, these 
implications allude to the undermining of the equity principle in creating the new R&D 
Grants. 
5.2.4.2 Certainty  
Adam Smith‟s principle of certainty claims that a person's tax obligations should be clear 
rather than ambiguous. This means that taxpayers should be able to govern their tax liabilities 
with reasonable certainty based on the nature of their transactions. If the transactions subject 
to tax are easy to recognise and value, there is more possibility for the principle of certainty 
to be attained. The same can be said for a taxpayer receiving a rebate from the Government. 
The taxpayer should also be in a position to be able to determine the amount of assistance 
they are likely to receive under the R&D Grant regime. 
As previously mentioned in the literature review, in examining the feasibility of the R&D 
rules, and to identify areas of concern, the New Zealand Government decided to take counsel 
from a private sector R&D Liaison Group. The predominant concern brought forth by the 
R&D Liaison Group is that there is a sweeping uncertainty regarding the definition of R&D.  
International Accounting Standard 38, which provides the definition selected for R&D 
expenditure under the R&D Grants, is known for bringing forth uncertainty as per the R&D 
Liaison Group recommendations. The ambiguity brought forth by use of the IAS 38 
definition for R&D would likely cause an issue in terms of the workability of a R&D Grant 
and can consequently increase uncertainty for a taxpayer undertaking R&D.  
Furthermore, Callaghan Innovation use Judgement Criteria as explained in Callaghan‟s 
„Ministerial Direction for Business R&D Grants‟ (Callaghan Innovations, 2015) to decipher 
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business proposals and determine their eligibility for a grant. For example, the criteria: 
„Benefits Outside the Business‟ which involves asking how much potential is there for 
benefit to accrue outside the business (Callaghan Innovation, 2015, p.7). The researcher 
deems the criteria used as elusive and involving a great deal of estimation on Callaghan 
Innovation‟s part. This may indicate that taxpayers remain uncertain regarding their 
eligibility to any grant under the R&D Grants regime. This is especially so since Callaghan 
Innovation administer the applications separate and distinct from others of the same kind (on 
a case-by-case basis) by considering each application at a time using somewhat subjective 
criteria in the process of legitimising claims, this limits ability of the business to predict the 
outcome of their application and plan ahead.  
Considering the above factors, the researcher concludes that the R&D Grants do not uphold 
the principle of certainty for the taxpayer.  
5.2.4.3 Convenience 
Different grants come with varying funding and payment timing agreements. In terms of the 
R&D Growth Grant funding, a business can expect to receive a maximum of $5M per year 
with ninety per cent of the amount paid up for “satisfactory invoices” and 10% held back as 
retention at the end of each quarter (Callaghan Innovation, 2015a, p.4-5). As for the Getting 
Started Grants, an eligible business can receive a one-off payment at the completion of the 
project (Callaghan Innovation, 2015b). The Project Grant funding agreement (Callaghan 
Innovation, 2015a, p.5-7) indicates that a claimant would receive the payment in arrears 
(monthly or quarterly). The R&D Career Grants (Callaghan Innovation, 2016), which involve 
a claimant brining a student on board for R&D problem solving support, specify that the 
grant amount be given provided that the student is paid by the business. It seems that in the 
majority, (except for the Project Grants) the grant amounts are given after the R&D work has 
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been completed, that is, after the invoices are provided or upon the finishing of the R&D 
project. This may have unfavourable cash flow implications for some businesses that do not 
possess the internal capital to conduct the project. For example, the insinuation behind 
businesses receiving the Getting Started Grant is that these businesses are merely in their 
infancy and are monetarily challenged in the short-term; receiving the funding upon the 
completion of the project may cause cash-flow issues for such claimants and hence become a 
disincentive to invest in R&D. 
Moreover, for most of the R&D Grants, the claimant cannot use the funding for any costs 
incurred before the contact start-date or after the contract end date. This may prove 
inconvenient for a claimant had there been untimely delays from the long application process 
for a particular grant involving steps such as providing financial forecasts for the three years 
ahead. This may lead the claimant to initiate the project prior to the contract start date as 
otherwise, due to the long process; claimants with projects in the idea phase awaiting a grant 
may face the risk of having their idea developed by another business. This complication 
would mean that the amount of R&D expenditure spent on the project before the start date is 
non-claimable for that business.  
Therefore, the researcher considers that the treatment brought by the implementation of the 
R&D Grants would generally bring a timing disadvantage upon prospective claimants and 
consequently is likely to have negative convenience implications. The researcher concludes 
that the R&D Grants do not uphold the principle of convenience for the taxpayer.  
5.2.4.4 Economy 
A Regulatory Impact Statement was released in relation to the repeal of the past R&D Tax 
Credits primarily on the basis of high estimated fiscal cost (Treasury, 2008). The estimated 
fiscal cost of maintaining the R&D Tax Credit was estimated to be $373 million per year 
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from 2011/2012 (Treasury, 2008, p.9). In terms of the fiscal cost involved with Callaghan 
Innovation administered R&D Grants, the 2015 Annual Report advises that during the 
2014/2015 financial year, approximately 523 businesses had received $165 million funding in 
aggregate (Callaghan Innovation, 2015, p.6).  
Therefore, the fiscal cost of maintaining the Callaghan Innovation administered R&D Grants 
is approximately one half of what is estimated to be spent on maintaining the R&D Tax 
Credit. In comparison, the R&D Grants would appear as more fiscally manageable to 
maintain for the state. Moreover, in terms of administration costs for the state, the 
outsourcing of the Grant administration process to Callaghan Innovation which holds 400 
staff (Callaghan Website, 2015) can surely alleviate the Government‟s bureaucratic burdens. 
Thus, the Callaghan Innovation administered R&D Grants, especially when compared to the 
R&D Tax Credit regime, seem to uphold the principle of economy for the state. 
On the taxpayer level, however, the administrative costs are somewhat steep given the extent 
of research which a claimant must commit to as the Callaghan Innovation website is difficult 
to navigate through as there is a significant body of documents to filter through. 
After this step, the claimant is advised to lodge an initial call to Callaghan Innovation to 
become acquainted with the basics of the Callaghan Innovation Grant process. Fiscal cost for 
the claimant is likely to be high as an extensive level of documentation is required to meet the 
standard of information which Callaghan necessitates in terms of establishing eligibility to a 
grant. While bigger firms may have the capital to allocate the significant work required for 
administrative to an external source, for a smaller firm this may mean more time and money 
invested on meeting the requirements rather than that effort going into expanding and 
investing. Hence, the extent of the administrative procedure necessary to secure a grant may 
deter a claimant.  
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The researcher argues that the R&D Grants are economical for the state, however, not for the 
claimant. Therefore, the principle of economy is neither upheld nor abandoned which results 
in a No-Effect result (neither negative nor positive). 
5.2.5 R&D Cash Out of Losses  
5.2.5.1 General Overview & Policy Rationale 
As this incentive has only just become law and been active for one financial year, to the 
researcher‟s knowledge, no prior academic research exists on these. The opinions of tax 
practitioners are utilised in this section since tax practitioners who have dealing with the 
R&D Cash Outs arguably hold the expert opinion. 
This incentive focuses on R&D intensive start-up companies, and intends to lessen their risk 
of encountering market failures arising from the current tax treatment of losses. Loss-making 
companies will be able to claim up to 28 per cent of their losses from R&D expenditure in 
any given year. As the losses come forward, this provides a temporary timing benefit.  
This R&D incentive introduced a change facilitating a non-discretionary, broad-brush 
approach to incentivising R&D: an „access for all‟ approach to R&D that is administered in a 
less targeted approach than the R&D Grants. The previously discussed R&D Grants were 
only targeted towards a small part of the economy and hence many companies would not 
have access to any funding at all. This R&D incentive changes this culture by bringing new 
support for R&D start-ups.  
5.2.5.2 Targeted Claimant 
This R&D incentive has been developed with a specific target in mind. The targeted 
companies are innovative start-ups. The most pressing aim of the creation this R&D incentive 
is to provide a timing advantage, allowing these companies to access their R&D losses and 
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manage early cash flow issues; overcoming one of the key barriers to start-up companies 
carrying out R&D. This incentive can be thought of as an interest free loan from the 
Government which has to be paid back from the taxpayer‟s future taxable income. 
5.2.5.3 Rate of R&D Allowance, Eligible Expenditure, and Administrative Procedure 
The main eligibility requirements are that the company has to be a loss-making company. 
The company also has to be a resident in New Zealand. To be eligible, a company must spend 
a minimum of 20 per cent of its total labour expenditure on R&D for a total of one income 
year for which the applicant exists;
7
 this proportion requirement is referred to as the wage 
intensity criteria. As this R&D incentive caters to the above described demographic, this 
means that this incentive is not aimed at taxpayers with complex tax arrangements. 
In regard to the wage intensity criteria submitters raised concerns that using the R&D wage 
intensity measure proposed in the issues paper would severely curtail access to the policy 
because R&D start-ups often use alternatives to PAYE wages and salaries. R&D start-ups 
may use shareholder-employee salaries and contracted labour instead of PAYE wages and 
salaries because of the greater flexibility they offer to companies with cash-flow constraints. 
Submitters also noted that the costs for outsourced R&D are commercially sensitive; for 
example it could indicate their profit margin. The contracted supplier of the R&D would be 
unlikely to provide this information to the contractor in the invoice. 
5.2.6 Adam Smith Principles Evaluation – Current R&D Cash Out   
The net impact of this option is transferring a timing advantage from the Government to 
eligible businesses. On balance, this timing advantage is expected to be much more valuable 
to target businesses (cash-constrained R&D start-ups) than to the Government, and is 
                                                          
7
 Refer to section MX 3, „Wage Intensity Criteria‟, of the Income Tax Act 2007. 
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therefore expected to have a positive impact at the margin on incentives to invest in R&D as 
well as the likelihood of successful innovation.  
The below submissions used for benchmarking against Adam Smith‟s (1776) Principles of 
Good Taxation are taken from various submitters‟ suggestions on the Taxation (Annual Rates 
for 2015-2016, Research and Development, and Remedial Matters) Bill to the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee (FEC) (The New Zealand Parliament, 2015).  
The theoretical framework used in this research, institutional theory, is concerned with how 
political and social institutions contribute greatly to shaping political “actors” in terms of the 
way these political actors then define their interest and exert their influence on other groups, 
this framework is supplemented by agency theory. The researcher recognises that under this 
framework, the submitters who are tax practitioners and are representing their clients 
represent their clients to their best interest. The submitters are a social institution, which 
influences the political actors (state representatives) to make legislative changes that would 
benefit them. This premise describes the interplay between the state and submitters. This 
interaction influences the tax policy area, and hence the extent to which policy outcomes 
reflects the preferences and influence of social institutions. 
This theoretical modelling helps clarify that R&D is highly political illustrated by the repeal 
of the R&D Tax Credit resulting from a change in Government; it was put down to 
politicization rather than sound economic reasoning.  
5.2.6.1 Equity 
As mentioned previously, this incentive focuses on R&D intensive start-up companies, and 
intends to lessen their risk of encountering market failures arising from the current tax 
treatment of losses. Eligibility for the Cash Out excludes entity types such as a Look-Through 
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Company on the basis that these companies have their own regime whereby the losses flow 
through to the shareholders. Other exclusions include similar entity types to those excluded in 
the R&D Tax Credit regime such as Crown Research institutes, which have access to more 
effective funding mechanisms. The researcher considers that these are mechanisms aimed to 
increase the equity of the R&D Cash Out incentive. 
The submissions lodged to the Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) (as mentioned 
above) had proposed some measures which allow this incentive to be more equitable. Some 
of the measures include broadening business eligibility criteria to include qualifying 
companies on the grounds that qualifying companies are a large group of taxpayers and that 
these companies no longer have flow-through treatment of losses (i.e. they do not have their 
own regime). The officials support this submission. This submission was suggested by 
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, and EY. The agency theory framework 
used in this research can inform the findings such that perhaps the social institutions who 
have argued this suggestion were acting in their own self-interest. Furthermore, as for the 
submission for inclusion of qualifying companies, agency theory could suggest that perhaps 
qualifying companies make up a large portion of the submitters‟ client base which would 
form a motivation for the submitters (social institution) to influence the Government 
(political institution) to bring changes to include qualifying companies in the regime and 
henceforth, accumulate more work from clients for the submitters.  
Another submission by Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, and Deloitte 
suggests the inclusion of companies within a group that includes a foreign company. The 
exclusion of such companies may prevent expansion offshore as well as prevent access to an 
international client base. The officials have accepted this submission, which would make the 
Cash Out more equitable given that once the submission is accepted; the Cash Out then does 
82 
 
not incur a difference of treatment between firms owned by non-resident, non-corporate 
bodies which are eligible and non-resident corporate bodies which are not. This establishes a 
higher level of equity for R&D Cash Out claimants. 
While the R&D Cash Out incentive is largely equitable for loss-making companies, it is not 
equitable for all companies as profit-making companies, and those breaking-even are 
excluded from this regime altogether. For this reason, the researcher considers the equity 
principle to be neither upheld nor abandoned within the R&D Cash Out which results in a 
No-Effect outcome (neither negative nor positive). 
5.2.6.2 Certainty  
The Inland Revenue has developed an interactive webpage within the Inland Revenue 
website for the new R&D Cash Out (Inland Revenue, 2016a). The webpage features a user-
friendly layout which includes a 5 step system aimed to guide a prospective claimant through 
an easy to follow process including an online eligibility tool (Inland Revenue, 2016b). The 
website simplifies the process to prospective claimants and increases certainty. 
Moreover, a multitude of submissions raised by different entities regarding measures which 
enable the drafting of the R&D Cash Out to be more clear have helped add certainty to the 
use of the R&D Cash Out. The submissions suggest inclusion of limited partnerships within 
the definition of “group of companies” for R&D Cash Out purposes (Inland Revenue, 2015b, 
p.5). The officials support this submission and agree that existing drafting may be difficult to 
apply to partnerships as they use different concepts than companies (Inland Revenue, 2015b, 
p.6). This submission was suggested by EY and has since been accepted by officials. 
A similar submission was put forth by an independent advisor to the select committee and 
requested clarification on the requirement that companies must comply with their tax 
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obligations to be eligible for the R&D Cash Out incentive. It was unclear whether if the non-
compliance was immaterial if the taxpayer can still elect to register for the Cash Out. This 
matter was accepted by officials.   
Many other submissions spoke to unclear provisions in the initial drafting of the R&D Cash 
Out including matters relating the wage intensity criteria, amount of cash out, R&D 
expenditure and reinstatement of losses. This consultation process highlighted many issues 
requiring clarification in the R&D Cash Out legislation, in most cases the submissions were 
accepted and applied bringing more clarity to the legislation. Therefore, the researcher deems 
the principle of certainty to be upheld by the R&D Cash Out incentive. 
5.2.6.3 Convenience 
As in the case of the R&D Tax Credit, the tax system administers the Cash-Out. The Cashed-
Out loss is similar in effect to an interest-free loan that the taxpayer is obliged to pay from 
their future taxable income.  
The essence of the R&D Cash Out incentive is to provide a temporary timing benefit for loss-
making companies by allowing up to 28 per cent of their recognised losses from R&D 
expenditure to come forward. Undertaking R&D activities involves high up-front costs. In 
comparison to other investment projects, the profit cycle for R&D inclines to be more heavily 
skewed towards early losses, which can pose a major barrier to businesses undertaking R&D. 
The treatment under the R&D Cash Out incentive would work to ease cash flow restraints on 
innovative start-ups and hence alleviate the barrier that stands in the way of innovative firms 
undertaking R&D.  
This allows a cash flow advantage to the taxpayer, and would coincide with the upholding of 
the convenience principle of Good Taxation. The researcher considers that the technical 
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treatment brought by the implementation of the Tax Credit would allow taxpayers a timing 
advantage and therefore likely have positive convenience implications.  
5.2.6.4 Economy 
Callaghan Innovation had agreed to work with Inland Revenue for support with the R&D 
Cash Out initiative by providing investment managers to Inland Revenue who assist by 
providing judgments on R&D eligibility in the early years of the initiative. This assistance 
could provide administration support to the Government as a measure that could speed up the 
application process and ensure it is handled in a timely manner. 
A submission raised by officials and lodged to the FEC proposed that information sharing 
with Callaghan Innovation and the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE) 
should occur as part of the initiative for the reasons of utilising an existing technology system 
(owned by MBIE) to administer the initiative. This submission was accepted and it is largely 
in accordance with Adam Smith‟s economy in Operation principle which states that the tax 
(or benefit in this case) should be levied (bestowed) with the lowest possible waste. 
Information sharing makes use of MBIE‟s existing technology system rather than developing 
an Inland Revenue system; this mitigates deadweight cost or the inefficient allocation of 
resources.  
For the taxpayer, the administration process involves the claimant applying to cash out their 
losses by submitting the application at the same time the income tax return for the company is 
being filed.
8
 Also, compilations of required statements on R&D expenditure for a lodged 
application are less strenuous than the past R&D Tax Credit regime which means lesser 
                                                          
8
 Proposed section 70C(2) of the TAA 1994 originally allowed a 14-day period for taxpayers to pay their R&D 
repayment tax, however, a submission from Inland Revenue suggested that the 14-day period be removed which 
would prevent the taxpayer having two different due dates. This submission was accepted. 
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compliance cost for taxpayers who are encouraged to be “concise” in their statements, (Inland 
Revenue, 2015b, p.28).  
In addition, the webpage developed for the new R&D Cash Out is created to simplify the 
process of obtaining a Cash Out amount which could mean lower psychological compliance 
cost for the claimant as well as lower fiscal cost as the claimant may be able to carry through 
the process independently of external practitioner assistance.  
Thus, the researcher argues the R&D Cash Out incentive upholds the principle of economy. 
5.3 R&D Incentives Information Synthesis Summary Table 
Table 5.1 below contains the R&D incentives‟ information synthesis summary for matters 
discussed in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.3, and 5.2.5 above. These matters include eligibility criteria, 
rate of allowance tendered by the R&D incentive, eligible expenditure, and administrative 
procedures involved. The findings are summarised above in a format which visually pins the 
incentives together to facilitate cross-comparison for the reader to decipher the differences 
(and similarities) among the incentives with a greater degree of ease.   
In regard to eligibility criteria, there are similarities in the general criteria required by all the 
incentives (such as “R&D must be done in NZ”) but most closely the R&D Tax Credit and 
the R&D Cash Out. As eligibility to both incentives requires a business to control or own the 
knowledge which results from the R&D activity. This requirement is not mentioned under the 
R&D Grants. Similarly, the definition used for the R&D activities (also used for the 
requirements of eligible expenditure) comes from the provisions in the Income Tax Act (ITA) 
2007 which govern R&D as opposed to the IAS 38 definition used for R&D activities for 
eligibility to the R&D Grants. Moreover, under business eligibility, both the R&D Tax Credit 
and the Cash Out both have a similar test which requires a selection of “any” entity type apart 
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from ones listed, whereas the R&D Grants specify the type of entity from the ones listed – a 
narrower eligibility. Lastly, under wage intensity criteria, a similar pattern may emerge as the 
steepest wage intensity requirements are associated with the R&D Grants (narrower 
eligibility).  
In terms of the rate of allowance, this category of requirements offer the most difference 
between the incentives, as the R&D Tax Credit offers a 15 per cent rebate, the Grants vary 
per grant type offering between 20 per cent and 40 per cent, and the Cash Out offers multiple 
options for calculating the tax credit which allow the claimant to select the option resulting in 
the smallest amount. 
As for the administrative procedures, the R&D Tax Credit and the Cash Out both have 
similar administrative procedures involving submitting a detailed summary of R&D spending 
at the same time as the income tax return for the company is being filed. Meanwhile, the 
R&D Grants involve a perhaps more time consuming procedure which consists of making 
contact with Callaghan staff then fill out applications and provide audited financial 
statements and filing progress reports and final proposal to Callaghan. 
Overall, Table 5.1 on the next page demonstrates the similarities and differences among the 
past and current New Zealand R&D incentives.  Table 5.1 allows the reader to notice the 
similarities among the R&D Tax Credit and the Cash Out, and the differences between the 








Table 5.1 – „R&D incentives‟ information synthesis summary‟ 
 
  
R&D  Tax Credit 2008-2009  
 
 
Callaghan Innovation Grants  
2013-Ongoing 
 














General Criteria: General Criteria: General Criteria:  
 
1. A business must control the 
R&D project, bear the 
financial & technical risk and 
own the project results. 
2. The entity must be in business 
in NZ. (Or via a fixed 
establishment in NZ) 
3. Special rules apply for 
industry research co-
operatives. 
4. Must conduct R&D activities 
as defined in LH7 („S.I.E‟) 
 
 
1. A business must meet 
financial and due diligence 
requirements. 
2. The claim must be for R&D 
done in NZ (unless pre-
approved) 
3. The claimant must have an 
active R&D programme. 
4. Must not bring the reputation 
of CI or the R&D Grants 
programme into disrepute. 
5. Must conduct R&D activities 
as defined in NZ IAS 38. 
 
 
1. A business must be a tax 
resident in NZ. 
2. Have a net loss in the 
corresponding tax year. 
3. Have eligible R&D 
expenditure for the income 
year. 
4. Own the intellectual property 
(IP) and the knowledge that 
results from the R&D activity. 
5. R&D expenditure as defined 
under the provisions which 
govern deductibility of R&D 
in the income tax rules. 
 
Business Eligibility Criteria: Business Eligibility Criteria: Business Eligibility Criteria: 
 
The business can be any entity type 
apart from the following:  
 A New Zealand Crown 
Research,  
 A tertiary institute,  
 A District Health Board,  
 An associate of the above; 
NOR, 
 Any entities under the control 
of any combination of the 
above. 
 R&D performed by a business 
in partnership with these 
entities is also ineligible. 
 
 
The business must be one of the 
following: 
 Registered under the 
Companies Act or the Limited 
Partnerships Act, 
 A Māori incorporation or trust 
established under the Te Ture 
Whenua  Māori Act, 
 A trust set up to manage 
assets as part of a Treaty of 
Waitangi settlement, 
 A Māori statutory body; OR, 
 A business controlled by one 
or more of these entities. 
 
The business can be any entity type 
apart from the following:  
A company which is resident of a 
foreign country, 
A look-through company (LTC). 
Listed on a recognised exchange, 
or have 50% or more of the shares 
in the company are owned by one, 
or of a: 
 Public authority 
 Local authority 
 Crown research institute 
 State enterprise 
 Established by or subject to: 
o Education Act „89 
o Public Health & Disability 
Act 2000 
o Crown Entities Act 2004 
 
Wage Intensity Criteria: Wage Intensity Criteria: Wage Intensity Criteria: 
 
Must spend at least $20,000 of 
eligible expenditure in the year a 
claim is made. Exception exists if 
the R&D services are purchased 
from an unassociated listed 
research provider.  
 
(Eligibility to Growth grant only) 
Must spend at least 300,000 in the 
year and 1.5 % of revenue on RDI 
in each of the last 2 years or plan to 
meet this in the following year.  
 
 
Must spend at least 20% or more of 
your total labour expenditure on 
R&D. 
 
R&D labour expenditure formula: 
 
Total R&D Labour Expenditure 





5.4 Adam Smith’s Principles of Good Taxation Evaluation Table Summary 
The below table displays a summary of the findings from benchmarking of the past and 
current New Zealand R&D incentives against Adam Smith‟s Principles of Good Taxation 
discussed in sections 5.2.2, 5.2.4, and 5.2.6 above. The above table (Table 5.2) bridges the 
findings in a visual manner between Table 5.1 above and Table 5.3 below. 
The summaries are further outlined in the following table (Table 5.3) under section 5.5 which 
ranks the order of the R&D incentives according to how equitable, certain, convenient and 
economical the R&D incentives‟ eligibility criteria, rate of allowance, eligible expenditure 
















The R&D Tax Credit is applied at 




The rate of R&D Grant varies by 
Grant type, as per below: 
 Growth Grant: 20 per cent of 
eligible R&D expenditure up 
to $5M p/y.  
 Getting Started Grant: 40 per 
cent of eligible R&D 
expenditure up to $5,000.  
 Project Grant: 40 per cent of 
eligible R&D project costs. 
 Career Grant: depending on 
career-grant type. Range 
$6,400 – $75,000. 
 
The amount of  Tax Credit is 
presented as an interest-free loan 
from the Government and to be 
paid by the taxpayer from future 
taxable income, the amount given 
is the smallest of the following: 
 $500,000 multiplied by the 
corporate tax rate (CTR). 
 The company‟s net loss for 
the year multiplied by the 
CTR. 
 The company‟s R&D 
expenditure for the tax year 
multiplied by the CTR. 
 The company‟s total R&D 
labour expenditure for the 
year multiplied by 1.5 and 


















Employee remuneration, training 
and travel of employees conducting 
R&D, depreciation of tangible 
property, consumables, certain 
overheads and payments to other 
entities conducting R&D. 
 
Any R&D expenditure as defined 
under IAS 38 para 57. Some 
general and Specific exclusions 
apply to the Growth Grant.  
Any R&D expenditure as defined 
under the provisions which govern 
deductibility of R&D in the income 
tax rules. Some exclusions apply to 
activities which take place in a 
post-development phase and are 













Business to provide a thorough 
statement of R&D spending. The 
business can claim the R&D Tax 
Credit in an income tax return. 
 
Contact CI and read the Grant 
funding agreement. 
File an application for a Grant. 
Provide audited financial 
statements. 
File an annual progress report or 
final proposal to CI. 
Personally investigate information 
on specific types of Grants as 
criteria differ per Grant type. 
 
Applications are to be completed at 
the same time the company‟s 
income tax return is filed 
electronically.  
Electronic filing is also required 





Table 5.2 – „Adam Smith‟s Principles of Good Taxation Evaluation Table Summary‟ 
 
  
R&D  Tax Credit 
 
 
Callaghan Innovation Grants   
 









Business eligibility criteria exclude 
entities, which can access more 
effective mechanisms for funding 
their R&D expenditure. 
 
Incentive offers no discrimination to 
all national firms like. 
 
Both vertically & horizontally 
equitable.  
 
Business eligibility criteria depict a 
niche demographic that many 
companies will not be eligible 
under. 
 
Largest funds go towards 
companies that already perform 
well in terms of R&D spending. 
 




Equitable Business Eligibility 
criteria. 
 
Inclusion of qualifying companies 
 
Good level of equity among loss-
making companies, but excluded 











Volume based incentive – 
simplicity. 
 
Option to apply to Commissioner 
for confirmation on R&D matters. 
 
Definition of R&D expenditure is 






Binary definition of R&D 
expenditure as per IAS 38 – 
ambiguous. 
 
Subjective/elusive criteria used by 
Callaghan Innovation to determine 







Website dedicated to assisting 
prospective claimants. 
 
Submissions for clarification of 
legislation drafting.  
 
Informed by experience gained 
internationally and by experience 














Timing benefit available for 
provisional tax paying firms who 
can access the benefit of the credit 






Unfavourable cash flow implication 
for some firms. 
 
Possibility of untimely delays 






Timing benefit available for loss-
making companies allowing losses 














Minimum threshold limit in place to 
bring compliance and admin cost to 
a minimum. 
 
Difficult to budget for. 
 
Taxpayer Level: 
Onerous level of admin and 
compliance requirements.  
 
High cost due to setting up or 
upgrading systems – indirectly 
attributable to the incentive. 
 







Fiscal costs are sustainable. 
 




Psychological compliance cost due 





Callaghan Innovation providing 
support to Government in terms of 
administration of the incentive. 
 




Concise statements needed. 
 
Website and resources available to 





5.5 Evaluation Matrix Summary 
As each of the four principles carry equal weights of 25 per cent each totalling 100 per cent 
overall, the incentives carrying the highest percentage out of 100 per cent are considered to 
hold the highest effectiveness ranking among the three incentives.  
Table 5.3 below shows that both the R&D Tax Credit and the R&D Cash Out are first-tied as 
they both carry a weight of 75 per cent, whilst the R&D Grants are in second place for 
carrying 25 per cent. 
Table 5.3 – „Evaluation Matrix Summary‟ 
+, ± , − R&D Tax 
Credit 
R&D Grants R&D Cash 
Out  
Equity 25% + − ± 
Convenience 25% + − + 
Certainty 25% + − + 
Economy 25% ± ± + 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 Introduction  
At the outset, this thesis applied an institutional theoretical framework, which sought to 
clarify the New Zealand R&D regime landscape facilitating an understanding of the 
rationales behind each policy created. This framework assisted the research findings by 
allowing the researcher to cast a critical eye as to offer insights into the degree to which the 
R&D policy design process advantages and disadvantages certain groups and to explain how 
institutions‟ interplay influences R&D incentive policy. Further objectives for this research 
included an exploration of each incentive and a cross-comparative analysis among all New 
Zealand‟s past and current R&D incentives. These inquiries would led to the third process 
concerning this research drawing tentative conclusions as to which incentive or set of 
incentives were likely to be considered the most effective when benchmarked against Adam 
Smith‟s (1776) Principles of Good Taxation.  
At the conclusion of the thesis, the findings addressed the research questions listed below: 
RQ1: Why did each incentive come into being? (Policy intentions) 
RQ2: How does each incentive fare when benchmarked against Adam Smith’s 
Principles of Good Taxation?  
RQ3: Which incentive(s) is/are likely most effective according to the above 
assessments? 
The thesis aimed to make two primary contributions. The first is to perform an overarching 
review of the environment that shaped the policies for the R&D incentive regimes in New 
Zealand. The aim from this step was to clarify the New Zealand situation by studying the 
policy rationales behind each R&D policy created. In addition, this thesis studied how 
political institutional arrangements and interplay between institutions have contributed to the 
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varying R&D incentive designs to similar policy problems (increasing the level of private 
sector R&D spending). The second key objective of the research was to provide some 
insights into how equitable, certain, convenient and economical each incentive is. These 
principles are used in this thesis as the overarching evaluative framework and are derived 
from the Adam Smith (1776) Principles of Good Taxation.  
6.2 Conclusions 
The historical overview undertaken by this research in chapter 3, „Current New Zealand R&D 
Regimes & Legislation‟, answered the first research question listed above (RQ1). The 
overview shows that R&D is a political matter. The researcher found that the role that 
institutional arrangements played between the enactment, repeal and the legislative changes 
of R&D incentive policy in New Zealand was very evident in New Zealand‟s past. Policy 
outcomes often reflected the preferences and influence of the State (New Zealand 
Government), interest groups (tax practitioners) and individuals (business owners). This 
interplay influenced the tax policy area.  Therefore, the decision to enact, repeal, and make 
legislative changes to R&D policy was often driven by politicization attributed to a change in 
government rather than sound economic reasoning (institutional factors). 
The discussion findings also addressed the second and third research questions (RQ2 & RQ3) 
in chapter 5, „Discussion‟ and show effectiveness according to Adam Smith‟s Principles of 
Good Taxation evaluation. The chosen principles carry equal weights of 25 per cent each 
totalling 100 per cent overall. When benchmarked, the incentives carrying the highest 
percentage out of 100 per cent are considered to hold the highest effectiveness ranking. The 
incentives‟ effectiveness according to Adam Smith‟s framework in relative ranking was 
found to show the R&D Tax Credit and R&D Cash Out of losses are tied in first place both 
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scoring 75 per cent, followed by the new R&D Callaghan Innovation Grants in second place 
scoring 25 per cent. This is based on the following assessments: 
6.2.1 The Past R&D Tax Credit  
The past R&D Tax Credit was deemed in this research as equitable, certain, convenient and 
neither economical not uneconomical.  
The findings of this research considered the R&D Tax Credit to be equitable due to the 
drafting of the Business eligibility criteria, which excluded entities that can access channels 
providing effective means of funding their R&D expenditure. The research finds that the 
R&D Tax Credit incentive offered no discrimination to firms and was therefore equitable. 
In terms of certainty, the past R&D Tax Credit employed mechanisms that could have 
improved the claimants‟ confidence of the incentive. For example, the choice of definition of 
R&D expenditure employed in the implementation of this incentive - an adaptation of the 
OECD-recommended Frascati Manual definition, allowed further clarity for the taxpayer. 
The researcher found the R&D Tax Credit was convenient for use by taxpayers given that the 
technical treatment of the tax concessions could trigger a timing benefit for provisional tax 
paying firms who could access the benefit of the credit closer to the time they incur R&D 
expenditure.  
Lastly, in terms of economy, on the state level, while the tax concessions provided a 
minimum threshold limit to bring compliance and administrative costs to a minimum, this did 
not greatly assist in the fact that the tax concessions were difficult to budget for due to scope 
issues and lack of reasonable constraints in eligible expenditure. 
At the taxpayer level, qualitative research undertaken in 2009 (Robinson, 2009) commented 
that practitioners found that the level of administrative and compliance requirements were 
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particularly onerous, especially due to the high costs of setting up or upgrading systems. 
However, the researcher argued that the setting up costs involved would have occurred 
regardless of the type of R&D incentive in place. Moreover, time that the incentive was in 
operation was a mere financial year, (2008-2009). This made the economy implications 
inconclusive. Hence, the R&D tax credit was considered neither to uphold the economy 
principle, nor to abandon it, as the high compliance costs for the first year of the incentive use 
are likely towards fixed setup cost, which would have occurred in any case. 
6.2.2 The Current Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants 
The current Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants were considered in this research to be 
inequitable, uncertain, inconvenient and neither economical not uneconomical.  
The findings of this research considered the current Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants to be 
inequitable as the Business Eligibility criteria depict a niche demographic that many 
companies will not be eligible under. Moreover, the largest funding amounts go towards 
companies that already perform well in terms of R&D spending. It is argued that given these 
companies‟ ability to source funding from internal and investor sources that they need not 
gain access to another governmental funding channel. These issues make the current 
Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants both vertically & horizontally inequitable as the incentive 
promotes discretionary assistance that favours one company over another. 
In terms of certainty, the current Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants employ mechanisms that 
undermine the claimant‟s confidence of the incentive. These mechanisms include the use of 
IAS 38 as the definition of R&D expenditure that an R&D liaison group has deemed to bring 
sweeping uncertainty. Moreover, Callaghan Innovation uses somewhat subjective/elusive 
criteria to determine eligibility of claimants for Project Grants that adds another layer of 
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complexity due to multiple interpretations possible of the criteria. These factors rendered the 
current Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants as lacking in certainty. 
The current Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants were also found to be inconvenient for use by 
taxpayers as in some cases it introduced unfavourable cash flow implications, for example: 
Getting Started Grants paid upon completion of the project. In addition, the possibility of 
untimely delays given the painstaking application process may hinder commercially sensitive 
innovations. 
Economically, the researcher suggested that the fiscal costs of maintaining the grants at the 
state level are considered sustainable considering that they work as an investment (rewarding 
“winners”) rather than governmental assistance to struggling companies. The outsourcing of 
administration to Callaghan Innovation also provides governmental administrative assistance, 
which alleviates economic burden on the Government.  
At the taxpayer level, there is a consideration that the long application process may have 
rendered some commercially sensitive innovation projects no longer valuable could cause 
anxiety for the taxpayer and perhaps high psychological compliance costs. Therefore, due to 
the mixed findings in terms of the economy principle, the researcher registered this as a no-
effect. 
6.2.3 The Current R&D Cash Out of losses 
The current R&D Cash Out of losses were considered in this research as neither equitable nor 
inequitable, certain, convenient and economical.  
The Business Eligibility criteria pertaining to the incentive captures mechanisms which 
increase equity such as fair inclusion of certain companies (qualifying companies) and fair 
exclusion of companies similar to exclusions of the past R&D Tax Credit incentive. In 
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addition, the implementation of this incentive was informed by experience gained 
internationally and by experience gained by the past R&D tax credit. These factors provide 
for a relatively adequate level of equity for the current R&D Cash Out of losses. However, 
the regime in itself is only equitable across loss-making companies. Therefore, profit-making 
companies and those breaking-even, are excluded from the regime altogether, hence, this 
incentive was considered as neither equitable nor inequitable. 
In terms of certainty, the current R&D Cash Out of losses employ mechanisms that can 
increase the claimant‟s confidence of the incentive. These mechanisms include fixing drafting 
issues raised by submitters who have asked for clarification on a range of matters, which have 
now been applied to the legislation. The Inland Revenue‟s creation of an all-encompassing 
website dedicated to assisting prospective claimants and providing tools which breakdown 
the process for the claimant increasing its simplicity and accelerating the claimant‟s 
understandability of the initiative.  
The current R&D Cash Out of losses were also found to be convenient for use by taxpayers 
given that the technical treatment of the losses carried forward allow timing benefits for loss-
making companies allowing losses to come forward easing cash flow restraints. This 
treatment renders the incentive as convenient for use by taxpayers. 
Lastly in terms, of economy, on the state level, Callaghan Innovation provides support to the 
Government in terms of administration of the incentive. This alleviates the Government‟s 
administrative burdens somewhat. Moreover, due to the approval of submissions suggesting 
information sharing using the existing information and technology systems to take place, this 
brings the deadweight loss to a minimum.  
At the taxpayer level, officials have advised that there are mechanisms that can assist the 
claimants by way of lessening compliance costs in the first year of use of the incentive (and 
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arguably the most burdensome year). Given the above mentioned resources created to 
empower taxpayers to handle their affairs independently and less stringent requirements for 
R&D expenditure explanations, the researcher considered that the current R&D Cash Out of 
losses were economical. 
6.3 Limitations 
This research is chiefly limited due to the scope constraints of this thesis and the research 
methods used. The research methods used in this study, documentary analysis and the case 
study approach, had limitations at the outset. The qualitative method of documentary analysis 
involves a time consuming process of collecting the appropriate data for study, which limited 
the amount of time the researcher was able to spend applying the actual findings across the 
principles being studied.  
The case study approach is also said to be limited in its generalisability and replicability. This 
is as each case study reflects one specific situation in time. However, these concerns are 
perhaps more associated with positivist research aiming to construct a broad-spectrum theory 
clarifying how the involved parties will act. The research undertaken by the researcher in this 
thesis was more closely associated with an interpretivism approach, which attempted to inject 
coherence to the body of research of the topic in view of different occasions, periods or 
circumstances. 
Another limitation in this particular research was the lack of ability to locate practitioners 
who specialise in the R&D Tax Credit as most have relocated overseas in response to the 
repeal of the R&D Tax Credit. However, as this research draws upon Robinson‟s findings 
(2009) from research that conducted interviews with practitioners, the research is also then 
limited in the interviewees in Robinson‟s research have a natural bias towards preferring the 
R&D tax credit, affecting their communicated opinions drawn upon in this research. Also, in 
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terms of the R&D Tax Credit, there are inherent limitations in firmly concluding data for Tax 
Credit as the credit was enacted for a sum total of one financial year which is deemed 
insufficient for revealing absolute truths. In addition, the R&D Cash Out has never been used 
internationally, to the researcher‟s knowledge; therefore, helpful comparative studies are 
inexistent at this stage.  
6.4 Future Areas of Research 
This thesis has contributed to the R&D body of knowledge by being one of its firsts to 
examine all of New Zealand‟s past and current R&D incentives. Following a literature review 
and a historical overview undertaken in chapter 2 and 3, information was collected and 
summarised in table 5.1 (under section 5.3 above). Table 5.1 was created to capture the key 
information that pertains to each of the past and current New Zealand R&D incentives. While 
the table was effective as an information summary synthesis mechanism, the table also serves 
as a standalone tool to allow the reader to facilitate cross comparison among the incentives 
and also grapple with the large amount of information surrounding each incentive. To the 
researcher‟s knowledge, this table is one of its firsts to be created to encompass all past and 
current New Zealand R&D incentives.  
This research is also (to the researcher‟s knowledge) one of its firsts to study the R&D Cash 
Out incentive and the Callaghan Innovation R&D Grants. The Callaghan R&D Grants have 
been effective since 2013 yet there remains no research on the incentive. This is a research 
gap that the researcher contributed to in this thesis. Moreover, while the R&D Cash Out is 
merely in its infancy, this thesis provided the preliminary steps for future research to take 
place. As for the R&D Tax Credit, this research adds to the sparse non-quantitative body of 
knowledge by using a qualitative research method to explore this incentive. This thesis also 
chooses an evaluative framework (Smith, 1950) which uses four principles (equity, certainty, 
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convenience and economy) to benchmark the incentives in chapter 5 and tentatively identify 
areas of strength and weakness for each incentive. This evaluative framework can be 
expanded on in future research as briefly mentioned in chapter 4 above. 
A limitation of this study was that opportunities for conducting interviewees with R&D tax 
practitioners and company R&D managers were scarce due to the repeal of the R&D Tax 
Credit. Perhaps now that the R&D Cash Out is in place and may increase interest in R&D, 
this would increase the number of available interviewees willing to be interviewed. This 
presents an opportunity to conduct interviews that access the New Zealand R&D 
practitioners‟ opinion on the R&D incentive situation: an update of Robinson‟s 2009 
dissertation research to identify recent developments in the R&D incentive realm.  
Future research in this area could include a follow up study that empirically tests the 
conclusions of this research by conducting a survey that asks companies around New Zealand 
to benchmark past and current R&D incentives. This would add to the body of knowledge as 
to the researcher‟s knowledge there is yet a quantitative study that uses Adam Smith‟s 
principles to benchmark the R&D incentives studies in this project. 
Future research in this area could also include an evaluation of the R&D process including 
studying the R&D incentives from an administration and audit probability standpoint and 
shed light on New Zealand‟s R&D areas of strength and weakness. Moreover, the OECD 
countries previously indicated as similar to the New Zealand R&D situation are, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Perhaps 
comparative studies in these countries could result in interesting conclusions that can add to 
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